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INTRODUCTION
The 21
st
century has been marred by corporate scandal after scandal—
including financial fraud,
1
pyramid schemes,
2
international bribery,
3
and
decades of sexual harassment.
4
This raises a question regarding the role of
corporate and tort law in reining in the behavior of corporate executives. It
is clear that directors and officers should not be overexposed to tortious
liability—doing so would make them ultimately insurers of the firm’s
obligations.
5
Yet, underexposure to liability has adverse consequences
when directors and officers are not required to conduct themselves
reasonably. This may embolden them to act without due care, not only
with regard to their duties to shareholders, but also with respect to
interactions with third parties.
6
Furthermore, underexposure works an
injustice to third parties who would otherwise have broad access to the
ordinary principles of tort law. That is, underexposure precipitates
1. Hugh Grove & Elisabetta Basilico, Major Financial Reporting Frauds of the 21st
Century: Corporate Governance and Risk Lessons Learned, 3 J. FORENSIC& INVESTIGATIVE
ACCT. 1 (Special Issue 2011).
2. Chapter 7: MLM’s Abysmal Numbers in JON M. TAYLOR, THE CASE (FOR AND)
AGAINST MULTI-LEVEL MARKETING, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/publi
c_comments/trade-regulation-rule-disclosure-requirements-and-prohibitions-concerning-bus
iness-opportunities-ftc.r511993-00008%C2%A0/00008-57281.pdf [https://perma.cc/MWV2
-K4YW] (comparing multi-level marketing and traditional pyramid schemes).
3. Robbie Gramer, Bribery Is on the Rise Worldwide, and It Costs A Lot More Than
Just Money, FP (Dec. 1, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/01/global-bribery-corrupt
ion-scandal-worldwide-index-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/KL7D-8L2S].
4. Rhitu Chatterjee, A New Survey Finds 81 Percent of Women Have Experienced
Sexual Harassment, NPR (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/0
2/21/587671849/a-new-survey-finds-eighty-percent-of-women-have-experienced-sexual-har
assment [https://perma.cc/77Q9-G4MH].
5. Frank Easterbook & Daniel Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89, 93–94 (1985). For further discussion, see infra Part II.
6. Shannon O’Byrne, Katherine Fraser, & Yemi Philip, The Tortious Liability of
Directors and Officers to Third Parties in Common Law Canada, 54 ALTA. L. REV. 878
(2017). See also Janis Sarra, The Corporate Veil Lifted: Director and Officer Liability to
Third Parties, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 55, 66 (2001) (observing that if directors acting in the best
interest of the corporation are exempt from tortuous conduct they will be encouraged to take
risks that may harm third parties). In addition, empirical research is casting doubt on the
efficacy of directors in fulfilling their gatekeeping role against corporate wrongdoing – and
in some cases, the data suggest they may be participating in self-serving behaviors. See
generally S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani, & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do Independent Directors
Curb Financial Fraud?, 93 IND. L. J. 757 (2018); S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani, & H.
Nejat Seyhun, Manipulative Games of Gifts by Corporate Executives, 18. U. PA. J. OF BUS.
L. 1131 (2016); S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani, & H. Nejat Seyhun, Ending Executive
Manipulations of Incentive Compensation, 42 J. CORP. L. 277 (2016).
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unfairness when, for example, the deserving third party plaintiff is denied
judgment simply because the tort is committed by an exempted director or
officer class.
7
And as evidenced by the scandals of late, underexposure
presents a serious risk of decay to corporate culture.
The question of director and officer personal liability in tort to non-
shareholder third parties poses a particular challenge because it involves a
deep contest between tort law values and corporate law values.
8
Because
pure tort law manifests strong notions of personal responsibility and
accountability,
9
it draws this simple conclusion: if one has committed a tort,
then one has personal liability. Corporate law, by way of contrast, moves
in the opposite direction. Imposing personal liability on directors and
officers acting in the course of their duties to the corporation would or
could threaten the modern corporation as a separate legal entity.
10
In short,
7. See Joan Loughrey, Breaching the Accountability Firewall: Market Norms and the
Reasonable Director, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 989, 1016 (2014) (“Holding market
participants accountable to the law signals that they are not exempt from the demands of
community morality. Markets are after all, embedded in society and exist to serve society’s
aims.”); Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
1765, 1809 (2009) (“[I]t is accountability as a constant social understanding that tort law
serves to reinforce. By a constant social understanding, I mean that – as we go about our
lives, make our choices and plan our activities – that we are answerable to one another. We
understand if the pursuit of our own ends is not conducted with due care for others, we may
be held to account by those we harm. By harming others, we incur a moral or social debt
that may be translated into a financial one. And those we harm may call us into the legal
system to settle our accounts.”) (footnote omitted).
8. For discussion, see O’Byrne, Fraser & Philip, supra note 6. See also Christian
Wittin, The Small Company: Directors’ Status and Liability in Negligence, 24 KING’S L.J.
343 (2013) (discussing the competing interests of a company director).
9. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 1809. See also Thomas C. Galligan Jr., Contortions
Along the Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 457, 460 (1994) (“Tort
law is more communitarian in nature and purpose. While contract law generally turns on
the idea that people can do as they choose, as long as they do not step outside its very broad
contours, tort law imposes more drastic limits on individual freedom . . . One may view the
reasonable person standard as the symbolic point at which society arrests unfettered freedom
of action.”); LEWIS KLAR & CAMERON JEFFRIES, TORT LAW 14 (6
th
ed. 2017) (“Tort law
operates as an important part of the Canadian society’s civil justice system. Its theoretical
underpinning – that a wrongdoer who injures another ought to be required to repair the
damage and restore the victim – is clearly an integral part of our system of values.”).
10. See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 667 (1819)
(“An aggregate corporation at common law is a collection of individuals united into one
collective body, under a special name, and possessing certain immunities, privileges, and
capacities in its collective character, which do not belong to the natural persons composing
it.”); Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U.S. 267, 273 (1908) (“A leading
purpose of [corporation] statutes and of those who act under them is to interpose a non-
conductor, through which, in matters of contract, it is impossible to see the men behind.”).
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making directors and officers broadly liable for torts committed in such
circumstances amounts to a forced, personal guarantee of the corporation’s
tortious liabilities.
11
This would both undermine and overwhelm the
principle of limited liability
12
and separate corporate personhood. Robert
Rhee calls this tension “inter-doctrinal divergence” and summarizes the
matter more broadly as follows: “[t]ort law finds fault; corporation law
excuses it.”
13
The purpose of this Article is to measure the coherency and fairness of
how various U.S. state courts attribute personal liability to directors and
officers in actions by non-shareholder third parties. The Article’s
touchstone throughout is Professor Lewis Checchia’s admonishment that
the law must not “reward unreasonable and unethical conduct” nor “deny
recovery to injured third parties with valid legal claims.”
14
Part I offers an assessment of U.S. common law with a focus on two
main fronts: negligence causing personal injury or property loss and
negligence causing pure economic loss. Analysis on the first front focuses
on decisions from Delaware in light of its preeminence in corporate law, as
well as contrasting approaches taken by California and New York courts.
It concludes, inter alia, that the law of Delaware is deficient for too broadly
shielding directors and officers in relation to negligence causing personal
injury and property loss. Analysis on the second front focuses on several
California decisions and one decision from the New York Court of Appeals
while acknowledging that case law concerning negligence causing pure
economic loss brought against directors and officers is relatively sparse.
This Part concludes that courts are correct to require proof that the
defendant officer or director owed a duty of care in his or her personal
capacity, but not all courts are sufficiently careful in analyzing the duty
See also O’Byrne, Fraser & Philip, supra note 6, at 880–81.
11. Hogarth v. Rocky Mountain Slate Inc., 2013 ABCA 57, para. 146.
12. See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944) (“Limited liability is the rule, not the
exception; and on that assumption large undertakings are rested, vast enterprises are
launched, and huge sums of capital attracted.”); First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 625 (1983) (“Separate legal personality has been
described as ‘an almost indispensable aspect of the public corporation.”); Salomon v.
Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL).
13. Robert Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1141-1157 (2013) (arguing for an understanding of director’s
liability to the corporation such that tort and corporate law converge).
14. We adopt these words from Lewis Checchia which were offered in the context of
auditor liability to third parties. Lewis P. Checchia, Accountants’ Liability to Third Parties
under Bily v. Arthur Young & (and) Company: Does a Watchdog Need Protection, 38 VILL.
L. REV. 249, 284 (1993).
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question. In short, the economic loss doctrine in U.S. state law is harsh vis-
à-vis the injured party, largely insulating directors and officers from
personal liability.
Part II shifts gears and assesses Canadian law as a useful comparator.
This Part concludes that Canada is correct to treat directors and officers as
any other defendants in the context of personal injury and property loss but,
in varying ways, may stumble when it comes to assessing liability for
simple negligence causing pure economic loss. On the one hand, some
courts have historically underexposed directors and officers to liability in
relation to ordinary negligence causing pure economic loss by foreclosing
recovery as a matter of course. On the other hand, certain courts have
leaned toward overexposing directors and officers for this same kind of
liability by too easily finding that the plaintiff was owed a personal duty of
care by the individual defendant. Fortunately, a new line of authority in
Alberta is largely successful in addressing these deficiencies.
Drawing on all the Article’s jurisdictional sources, we offer some
brief conclusions, including that the ideal liability regime is one that
eschews special defenses for directors and officers.
I. DIRECTOR ANDOFFICER LIABILITY TONON-SHAREHOLDER
THIRD PARTIES IN THEUNITED STATES
Prior to assessing director and officer liability to non-shareholder third
parties, it is important to note that in Delaware, for example,
15
statutory law
permits corporations to exculpate directors from monetary liability to the
corporation for breach of fiduciary duty, excepting breach of the duty of
loyalty, acts not in good faith, intentional misconduct and actions resulting
in an improper personal benefit.
16
That is, Section 102(b)(7) of the
15. “Between 1985 and 1995, approximately forty other states followed Delaware’s
lead in authorizing the release of damage claims for breach of a duty of care.” WILLIAM T.
ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 246 (5th ed. 2016).
16. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §102(b)(7)(2017). See Michael Bradley & Cindy A.
Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (1989) for a discussion of the impact of Van Gorkom resulting in the amendment
to the Delaware Code. Other U.S. states followed Delaware’s lead and similarly adopted
legislation limiting or eliminating liability for directors for breach of the duty of care. See
Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39
EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160–61 (1990) (reporting that over 90 percent of a sample of Delaware
public corporations adopted exculpatory provisions); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 479 (2000) (“Exculpatory charter
provisions adopted pursuant to statutes, universally enacted since Van Gorkom, have
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Delaware Code permits firms to eliminate monetary liability of directors to
the corporation and its shareholders for damages ensuing from acts of gross
negligence.
17
The amendment’s appeal to freedom of contract helped to
broadly quell the aftermath of the Delaware Supreme Court decision in
Smith v. Van Gorkom,
18
which found the defendant directors grossly
negligent and thus in breach of their duty of care. Concerns about this
decision included the precipitous escalation of insurance costs for directors
and fears that individuals qualified to serve as directors would otherwise
exit the market,
19
making everyone worse off. For these kinds of reasons,
the new provision permitted further degradation of the already low
common law standard directors owed to shareholders and the corporation
(that of gross negligence). One informing idea was that corporations and
shareholders should be able to choose the foundation of their relationship,
with freedom of contract as an established, albeit contested, value or
rationale.
20
Though shareholders stand to lose by virtue of reduced director
accountability on the duty of care front (including the risk of shirking),
these risks are presumably offset by gains, including access to a strong pool
of individuals willing to serve and the increased opportunity for “desirable
entrepreneurial decision making.”
21
As a result, the Delaware Code (and its
rendered the damages claim for the breach of duty of care essentially non-existent.”); See
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the
Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989), for a discussion of the tension between
innovative contractual freedom and mandatory enforcement of strict fiduciary duties. See
also Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty:
An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075
(2017), for the same debate in the context of the “mandatory” fiduciary duty of loyalty and
corporate opportunity waivers.
17. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2017).
18. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). “Before Smith v. Van Gorkom,
the duty of care had been ‘essentially unenforceable as a stand-alone concept,’ but Van
Gorkom made it into an enforceable duty that came to occupy a more central place on the
corporate law stage.” Stephen P. Lamb, Duty Follows Function: Two Approaches to Curing
the Mismatch between the Fiduciary Duties and Potential Personal Liability and Corporate
Officers, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 45, 53 (2012) (quoting William T.
Allen et. al, Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware
Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1290 (2001)).
19. Edwards P. Welsh & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and its Limits in the Delaware
General Corporate Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845 (2008).
20. Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and
Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1991).
21. SeeWelsh & Saunders, supra note 19, at 855 (quoting Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v.
NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 793 (Del. Ch. 2004)) (identifying as the purpose of section
102(b)(7) to “encourage ‘capable persons to serve as directors . . . by providing them with
the freedom to make risky, good faith business decisions without fear of personal
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counterparts in other states) empowers a departure from the common law in
relation to the director-corporation and director-shareholder relationship.
22
Accepting for the purposes of this Article that internal groups should
be able to lower common law standards inter se, the question becomes
whether directors should likewise owe a lower standard of accountability to
those external to the corporation (such as creditors, customers, employees,
and tenants). At the most general level, lowering the standard in relation to
external groups collides with purposes of tort law, which include redressing
injurious wrongs;
23
compensating innocent injured parties; shifting the
costs to the appropriate parties; and deterring future wrongful conduct.
24
Tort law accomplishes these purposes, in part, “through the recognition of a
duty to exercise reasonable care and the imposition of liability for the
breach of such a duty.”
25
With this context in mind, on what basis, if any,
should the ordinary protection of tort law be reduced or eliminated when
third parties interact with corporate directors and officers?
Concerning the tortious liability of directors and officers in the U.S.,
the law is clear that these individuals are not personally liable for torts
based solely on their positions within a corporation.
26
This is entirely
appropriate because directors and officers are not guarantors of corporate
operations. Rather, directors and officers must have engaged in the tortious
behavior at issue or otherwise have a connection to it in order to be liable.
27
liability’”); 57 DEL. CODEANN. tit 8, § 122(17) (2001).
22. See Welsh & Saunders, supra note 19, at 850 (quoting Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 313 (1952) (“the stockholders of a Delaware corporation may by
contract embody in the [certificate] a provision departing from the rules of the common law,
provided that it does not transgress a statutory enactment or a public policy settled by the
common law or implicit in the General Corporation Law itself.”)).
23. VA. PRAC. TORT AND PERSONAL INJURY LAW § 1:2 (Nov. 2018).
24. AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 1:3 (Mar. 2019).
25. Id.
26. Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability for
Supervision and Management: Exploring the Intersection of Corporate and Tort Law, 59
AM. U. L. REV. 1661, 1667 (2010); see also 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 640 (“A director,
officer, or agent is not liable for torts of the corporation or of other officers or agents merely
because of his or her office. He or she is liable for torts in which he or she has participated
or which he or she has authorized or directed.”).
27. See Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406, 408–09 (10th Cir. 1958)
(“It is the general rule that if an officer or agent of a corporation directs or participates
actively in the commission of a tortious act or an act from which a tort necessarily follows
or may reasonably be expected to follow, he is personally liable to a third person for injuries
proximately resulting therefrom. But merely being an officer or an agent of a corporation
does not render one personally liable for a tortious act of the corporation. Specific direction
or sanction of, or active participation or cooperation in, a positively wrongful act of
commission or omission which operates to the injury or prejudice of the complaining party
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Following agency law principles, directors and officers are personally
liable for torts they commit—even when the tort is committed in an official
capacity
28
and even if a director or officer is acting for the benefit of the
corporation rather than for personal gain.
29
However, as is discussed
below, directors and officers in certain jurisdictions face considerably less
liability, particularly in the cases of negligence, than would other
defendants. This differential treatment is problematic because it raises the
specters of unaccountability, a decline in corporate culture, and lack of
justice for the plaintiff.
Personal liability of directors and officers for intentional torts such as
fraud is relatively routine and non-controversial, given the extreme nature
of the conduct involved.
30
Personal liability for negligence is more
problematic and contested. Accordingly, it is the focus of the following
section.
A. Negligence Causing Personal Injury or Property Damage
Courts have found that the type of injury caused by the defendant
matters in determining culpability and thus broadly differentiate between
personal injury and property damage, on the one hand, and pure economic
loss, on the other. Outside a corporate context, tort law is quick to find a
duty of care when the defendant has negligently caused personal injury or
is necessary to generate individual liability in damages of an officer or agent of a
corporation for the tort of the corporation.”).
28. Petrin, supra note 26, at 1668; see also 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 640 (“A director,
officer, or agent is not liable for torts of the corporation or of other officers or agents merely
because of his or her office. He or she is liable for torts in which he or she has participated
or which he or she has authorized or directed.”).
29. Petrin, supra note 26, at 1668.
30. See id. at 1709 (“This deviation from an effort to limit personal liability is justified
because, apart from moral hazard considerations, directors and officers, like any other
person, remain under a duty not to commit intentional torts.”). See PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha,
78 Cal. App. 4th 1368, 1382 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2000) (“All persons who are shown to have
participated in an intentional tort are liable for the full amount of the damages suffered.
This rule applies to intentional torts committed by shareholders and those acting in their
official capacities as officers or directors of a corporation, even though the corporation is
also liable” (citing Vacco Industries, Inc. v. Van Den Berg 5 Cal. App. 4th 34, 53, fn. 20
(1992)); Klein v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd. 211 Cal. App. 3d 67, 76–79 (1989) (general partner
could be personally liable for conspiring to violate the Sherman Act on behalf of limited
partnership); see also Am. Med. & Life Ins. Co. v. CrossSummit Enters., 910 N.Y.S.2d 403,
411 (2010) (“Corporate officers and directors may be held individually liable if they
participated in or had knowledge of the fraud, even if they did not stand to gain personally.”
(quoting Pludeman v. Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 486 (2008)).
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property damage because of the nature of the interest involved. As noted in
Restatement (Third) of Torts, when the defendant’s conduct creates a risk
of physical harm, the defendant owes a duty to act with due care.
31
Furthermore, as held by Justice Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad, the defendant owes a duty of care to those whom a reasonable
person would have foreseen a risk of harm—that is, the question is whether
the injured party was within a “foreseeable zone of danger.”
32
The scope of
that duty is defined as the reasonable person standard: each person owes a
duty to act as a reasonable person would under the same or similar
circumstances.
33
Within a corporate context, it is possible to reach the same result but
courts tend to follow a different framework to get there. This framework
requires the plaintiff to show acts by the individual defendants amounting
to direct participation in the wrongful conduct.
34
In certain jurisdictions,
the framework has afforded directors and officers an effective but unduly
extensive shield from tortious liability. In Delaware, the requirement of
participation in the personal participation doctrine excludes liability for
“nonfeasance or the omission of an act which a person ought to do.”
35
For
example, in the Delaware Superior Court case of Brandt v. Rokeby Realty
Co., the tenant suffered personal injuries resulting from toxic mold in a
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7(a) (2010).
32. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 248 N.Y. 339 (1928). The duty analysis however,
is not without its challenges. According to Professor Leon Green, “both foreseeability and
reasonableness imply conduct based on considered judgment, while the conduct in
negligence cases is frequently instantaneous and rarely based on considered judgment.”
Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1420 (1961).
Furthermore, the jury’s decision on negligence “should not be based on the impossible
foresight of some mythical person, but on the factual details made known to the jury,
frequently long after the defendant’s conduct occurred.” Id. See also the dissenting opinion
of Judge Andrews in Palsgraf, arguing that duty is not imposed on the basis of
foreseeability, rather duty is imposed because one must refrain from unreasonably
threatening the safety of others. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 248 N.Y. 339 (1928)
(Andrews, J. dissenting opinion).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7(a) (2010); see, e.g., Mansfield v. Circle K.
Corp., 877 P.2d 1130 (Okla. 1994) (“[T]he standard of conduct is that of a reasonably
prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.”).
34. See, e.g., Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1958)
(requiring plaintiff to show acts by the individual defendants amounting to an “affirmative
direction, sanction, participation, or cooperation in the alleged tortious act of the corporate
defendant”). See also cases cited infra notes 36-77 and accompanying text.
35. Yavar Rzayev, LLC v. Roffman, No. CV S14L-12-035 MJB, 2015 WL 5167930, at
*6 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2015) (quoting Heronemus v. Ulrick, No. CIV.A.97C-03-168-
JOH, 1997 WL 524127, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 9, 1997)).
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building owned by that corporate defendant.
36
The injured party sued both
the corporate defendant and the president of the corporation, Mr. Copeland,
among others, for negligence.
37
The court allowed Copeland’s motion for
summary judgment on the basis that he had not personally participated in
the tort.
38
The court stated that “[t]he personal participation doctrine stands
for the idea that an officer of a corporation can be held liable for his own
wrongful acts.”
39
Quoting the Delaware Superior Court decision in
Heronemus v. Ulrick,
40
the court further stated that “[c]orporate officers
cannot be shielded from tort liability by claiming the actions were done in
the name of the corporation.”
41
The court emphasized, however, that under
the personal participation doctrine, knowledge of health complaints would
not be sufficient.
42
Rather, the plaintiff “must show that the officer
‘directed, ordered, ratified, approved, or consented to’ the tortious act,” and
that the officer was engaged in misfeasance or “active negligence.”
43
In
short, there is no liability for “nonfeasance or the omission of an act which
a person ought to do.”
44
The court went on to add that “[c]laims based on
the failure to warn, inspect or repair, or implement and supervise indoor air
quality programs for common areas affected by mold [are] acts of
nonfeasance.”
45
The court found that, at most, the president had knowledge
of the health complaints, but took no action to harm the plaintiff, and thus
could not be liable under the personal participation doctrine.
46
In another negligence case, the Superior Court of Delaware in Ayers v.
Quillen asked whether the alleged negligence amounted to “active”
negligence or mere nonfeasance in the context of property loss.
47
The
difference would be critical because courts following this line of authority
would not hold directors liable for nonfeasance. In Ayers, two of plaintiff’s
dogs were injured by other dogs while being boarded at a kennel.
48
The
36. Brandt v. Rokeby Realty Co., No. C.A. 97C-10-132-RFS, 2004 WL 2050519, at *8–
10 (Del. 2004).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at *9.
40. Heronemus, No. CIV.A.97C-03-168-JOH, 1997 WL 52427, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct.).
41. Brandt, 2004 WL 2050519, at *9 (quoting Heronemus, 1997 WL 524127, at *2).
42. Id. at * 10 (citing Heronemus, 1997 WL 524127, at *2).
43. Id. (citing Heronemus, 1997 WL 524127, at *2).
44. Brandt, 2004 WL 2050519, at *10.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Ayers v. Quillen, No. CIV.A.03C-02-004-RFS, 2004 WL 1965866, at *3 (Del.
Super. Ct. June 30, 2004).
48. Id. at *1.
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kennel itself was incorporated and Mr. Quillen was the sole owner of the
corporation. After this incident, plaintiff brought a raft of claims against
Mr. Quillen, as an individual, on various theories of negligence and fraud.
One of Mr. Quillen’s defenses was that “[the plaintiff] was dealing with the
Kennel, which is a corporation,” and thus the claims against him as an
individual should be dismissed.
49
In responding to this defense, the court
first decided that Mr. Quillen was essentially an agent with a
managerial/directorial role because he had more control over this
corporation than anyone else.
50
After referencing agency and corporate
law,
51
the court turned to the personal participation doctrine.
52
It allowed
the claim to proceed to trial because Mr. Quillen managed the business.
The court left it to the plaintiff to prove the defendant’s active misfeasance
at trial, leaving no doubt that nothing less would do in order to find
liability.
53
Similarly, in another case involving property damage, the court
required active involvement in the wrong. In Washington House
Condominium Association of Unit Owners v. Daystar Sills, Inc., Daystar
Sills, Inc. (Daystar), the defendant corporation, was hired to build a
condominium for the Washington House Project.
54
When constructing the
building, the president and sole owner of Daystar, Mr. Sills, “approved the
decision to use ‘thin brick’ veneer in place of the full brick for cost and
time-saving purposes.”
55
He also worked on finding a manufacturer for the
thin brick product, and allegedly pushed to keep the construction on
schedule despite concerns raised about this product.
56
Within several years
after construction, this building began disintegrating in areas, with sections
of it crumbling and creating water leakage problems, among other issues.
57
All this culminated in a lawsuit where Mr. Sills was named as one of the
defendants.
58
Regarding whether Mr. Sills incurred personal liability, the
49. Id.
50. Id. at *3.
51. Id. The court cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958),
3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1135 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 2002), and 18B AM.JUR.2D CORPORATIONS §
1877 (1985); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 544 (1990).
52. Ayers, 2004 WL 1965866, at *3.
53. Id.
54. Wash. H. Condominium Assn. of Unit Owners v. Daystar Sills, Inc., No.
CVN15C01108WCCCCLD, 2017 WL 3412079, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 8, 2017).
55. Id. at *5.
56. Id.
57. Id. at *3–5.
58. Id. at 34.
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court denied summary judgment.
59
According to the Delaware Superior
Court, Mr. Sills could be personally liable because of his “‘direct[ing],
order[ing], ratif[ying], approv[ing], or consent[ing] to Daystar’s negligent
construction and repair of the Condominium” but not because of his in-
depth involvement in the project.
60
His liability exposure was for choosing
thin brick when he knew that there were concerns about this brick.
61
With
regard to the personal participation doctrine, Daystar focused on active
negligence: “[p]ersonal liability cannot be assessed absent
‘active negligence’ and a corporate agent’s knowledge of defects and
failure to warn or correct those defects will generally be considered acts
of nonfeasance.”
62
The implication under Delaware law is that officers and directors are
exonerated for simple negligence resulting from nonfeasance. Put another
way, unless the negligence is “active,” there is no liability. This is a
problematic distinction and one which the courts do not seem to justify.
Where personal injury and property damage are at issue, it is difficult to
accept specialized protection of directors and officers—at least absent a
compelling judicial account of why that should be the case and why the
specialized rule is the only way to obtain the desired result. If ordinary
(i.e.: non-director or officer) defendants can be found liable under tort law
principles for failing to take steps to protect a foreseeable plaintiff from the
very serious consequence of personal injury, it is difficult to see on what
basis a director or officer be should be relieved of responsibility for the
same omissions.
On a related front, the active personal participation approach is
deficient because it does not systematically address the duty component of
liability. Under the personal participation doctrine, the plaintiff must also
presumably show that the individual defendant owes them an independent
duty of care, but this ingredient can go unaddressed.
63
As Martin Petrin
notes, certain courts:
[D]o not explicitly discuss the requirement that the defendant
director or officer breaches a duty that he personally owes to the
injured party. Thus, it is unclear how these participation-based
cases deal with the duty requirement, i.e.: whether they implicitly
59. Id.
60. Id. at 36.
61. Id.
62. Wash. H. Condominium Assn. of Unit Owners v. Daystar Sills, Inc., No.
CVN15C01108WCCCCLD, 2017 WL 3412079, at *39 (Del. Super. Aug. 8, 2017).
63. Petrin, supra note 26, at 1671.
2019] PERSONAL LIABILITY OFDIRECTORS ANDOFFICERS IN TORT 93
assume that participation in a certain act or whether direct or
foreseeable contact by itself creates the necessary duty, whether
they work under the assumption that the corporation owed a duty
which is then delegated to the individual director or officer, or
whether they follow yet another approach.
64
Given these uncertainties and deficiencies, the approach taken in
California is a step in the right direction. As in Delaware, the California
courts require the personal participation of corporate officers and directors
in the tort before personal liability to third parties will ensue.
65
But, unlike
in Delaware, nonfeasance may be enough to hold a corporate officer or
director liable, provided a duty of care was owed to the third party. As the
California Court of Appeal in PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha stated:
To maintain a tort claim against a director in his or her personal
capacity, a plaintiff must first show that the director specifically
authorized, directed or participated in the allegedly tortious
conduct [citation]; or that although they specifically knew or
reasonably should have known that some hazardous condition or
activity under their control could injure plaintiff, they negligently
failed to take or order appropriate action to avoid the
harm [citations]. The plaintiff must also allege and prove that an
ordinary prudent person, knowing what the director knew at that
time, would not have acted similarly under the circumstances.
66
In this way, corporate directors and officers are held liable not just for
malfeasance but also for negligence involving nonfeasance according to the
ordinary rules of negligence.
The other aspect of the California approach that is superior is its
express analysis of the duty of care question. In Francis T. v. Village Green
Owners Association, for example, the personal liability of individual board
members of a condominium owners association, among other defendants,
was at issue for negligence related to an attack the plaintiff suffered in her
64. Id. at 1671 n.47.
65. Wyatt v. Union Mortg. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 785 (1979) (“Directors and officers of a
corporation are not rendered personally liable for its torts merely because of their official
positions, but may become liable if they directly ordered, authorized or participated in the
tortious conduct.”). This rule can be traced back to a 1970 case, United States Liab. Ins. Co.
v. Haidinger v. Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 595 (1970), which cited a number of secondary
sources as its authority. See, e.g., 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 845.
66. PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1368 (2000), as modified on denial of
reh’g (Apr. 7, 2000) (quoting Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 42 Cal. 3d 490
(1986) (emphasis added)).
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condominium unit from a criminal break-in.
67
The lighting around the
condominium had been poor for some time.
68
To support her allegations of
negligence, the plaintiff first claimed the directors took affirmative action
by requiring her to remove the lighting she installed for self-protection
against someone breaking into her unit, an incident that was foreseeable
under the circumstances because the directors knew of a crime wave in the
area.
69
The attack happened the same day she complied with the order.
70
Second, plaintiff alleged that the directors were negligent by being too slow
to investigate and fix the lighting issues around the condominium—six
months passed between the time when the directors first started
investigating the lack of lighting and the incident in the plaintiff’s unit.
71
Further, plaintiff claimed the directors knew of the high crime levels in the
area, which meant they had knowledge of the risk the abysmal lighting
created.
72
In holding that the facts pled by the plaintiff were sufficient to
survive a demurrer, the California court stated “[d]irectors and officers
have frequently been held liable for negligent nonfeasance where they
knew that a condition or instrumentality under their control posed an
unreasonable risk of injury to the plaintiff, but then failed to take action to
prevent it.”
73
Beyond this, the Frances T. court engaged in discussions of the
association’s duty of care, as well as the individual directors’ duties of care.
The court noted:
[L]ike any other employee, directors individually owe a duty of
care, independent of the corporate entity’s own duty, to refrain
from acting in a manner that creates an unreasonable risk of
personal injury to third parties. The reason for this rule is that
otherwise, a director could inflict injuries upon others and then
escape liability behind the shield of his or her representative
character, even though the corporation might be insolvent or
irresponsible.
74
In the context of negligence causing property damage, the California
court in Michaelis v. Benavides also engaged in a duty analysis such that
the plaintiff was able to survive a motion for non-suit by the corporate
67. Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 42 Cal. 3d 490 (1986).
68. Id. at 509.
69. Id. at 510.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 505.
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officer defendant.
75
At issue was liability relating to a poorly-constructed
patio that developed multiple cracks that were caused by
use of insubstantial wire screen, not steel rebar, as the
reinforcement material, and [the president of the subcontractor
who built the patio’s] failure to install an expansion joint
between the concrete and home’s foundation. Also, the patio
concrete was not thick enough at the outer edges and slid down
the surrounding hill.
76
The court considered the individual defendant’s participation and also
analyzed the duty question in relation to the plaintiff/appellant:
Appellants’ allegations here show that respondent did not merely
make a corporate policy decision which was carried out by
someone else. He personally participated in and directed the
construction of appellants’ patio and driveway. He personally bid
for appellants’ job and he personally negotiated with appellants
for completion of the job. He personally made the decisions to
use cheaper materials and construction methods which allegedly
resulted in the patio’s and driveway’s structural inadequacies.
77
Given that property damage was involved, the court’s finding of a
duty of care very much fits with mainstream tort law. Furthermore, the
court also laid the foundation for its determinations on the duty front.
In sum, Delaware law correctly requires personal participation before
holding officers and directors liable to third parties for torts. Requiring
evidence of active malfeasance by the defendant is highly problematic
however, particularly in the context of personal injury or property loss. By
allowing exoneration in this context, the law is effectively permitting
directors and officers to be unaccountable in cases where exercise of
reasonable care would otherwise have avoided personal injury or property
damage to another. Instead, California’s approach is superior for calibrating
tort law, corporate law, and agency law, rather than elevating corporate law
values alone. This is because it permits liability for nonfeasance provided
the plaintiff can establish a duty of care.
75. Michaelis v. Benavides, 61 Cal. App. 4th 681, 684 (1998).
76. Id. at 683–84.
77. Id. at 686.
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B. Torts Causing Pure Economic Loss
As a general principle, it is difficult to recover pure economic loss in
tort. The genesis of this difficulty is the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Robbins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.
78
In this case, the Court
ruled against the plaintiff whose charter was delayed as a result of damage
that the defendant’s employee negligently caused to the ship’s new
propeller.
79
The foundation for this outcome was that the plaintiff had
contracted with the owners of the boat and not the defendants;
80
it was not
a third party beneficiary to the contract between defendant and vessel
owner; it had had no property interest in the vessel; and the dry-dock had
no reason to know of plaintiff’s existence.
81
The Court found that a “tort to
the person or property of one man does not make the tort-feasor liable to
another merely because the injured person was under a contract with that
other unknown to the doer of the wrong.”
82
According to Justice Holmes,
“[t]he law does not spread its protection so far.”
83
Historically, economic
damages were relegated to cases where pecuniary damages were also
accompanied by physical injury.
The holding of Robins Dry Dock & Repair is essentially reiterated in
section 776C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which reads:
One is not liable to another for pecuniary harm not deriving from
physical harm to the other, if that harm results from the actor’s
negligently:
a. causing a third person not to perform a contract with the
other, or
b. interfering with the other’s performance of his contract or
making the performance more expensive or burdensome, or
c. interfering with the other’s acquiring a contractual relation
with a third person.
84
The section bars recovery for defendant’s negligence absent physical
78. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). See, e.g., David
Gruning, Pure Economic Loss in American Tort Law: An Unstable Consensus, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 187 (2006); Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss under
American Tort Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 111 (1998).
79. See Robins, 275 U.S. at 309–10.
80. Id. at 303.
81. Gruning, supra note 78, at 189.
82. Robins, 275 U.S. at 309.
83. Id.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 776C (1979), 23–24.
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harm to either the person or property of the plaintiff.
85
The Restatement
(Second) of Agency applies the rule to agents: “Liability imposed upon
agents for active participation in tortious acts of the principal [has] been
mostly restricted to cases involving physical injury, not pecuniary harm, to
third persons.”
86
The economic loss doctrine is a judicially created doctrine “which
prohibits a party from recovering in tort for economic losses, the
entitlement to which flows only from a contract.”
87
There are, however,
exceptions to this doctrine regarding liability for intentional torts and
liability for some claims of negligence when the connection between the
tortfeasor and the plaintiff is foreseeable. This Part addresses these
exceptions, beginning first with a brief discussion of intentional torts of
officers and directors, followed by analysis of cases alleging negligence.
1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
When individuals actively participate in fraudulent
misrepresentations, on behalf of an entity, they may be found to be
personally liable in tort. In Yavar v. Roffman, a case was brought against
the company, an LLC, and the only principal of the company, Mr.
Rzayev.
88
The defendants were sued for breach of contract after a
contractor stopped working on a construction project, and the contractor
counterclaimed, alleging, among other things, that the principal committed
fraud. Here, it was alleged that Mr. Rzayev “made affirmative
representations, meeting the requirement that liability only be imposed for
‘misfeasance or active negligence’ as opposed to ‘nonfeasance or the
omission of an act which a person ought to do.’”
89
The court asserted that
“corporate officers are not derivatively liable for the torts of the
corporation; however, corporate officers are directly liable for the torts
they personally commit, whether on behalf of the corporation or
otherwise.”
90
The Delaware court allowed the claim to proceed.
91
In addition, in 2018, the California Court of Appeal reversed a lower
court’s decision and held the owner and managing member of an LLC
85. Gruning, supra note 78, at 190.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY, § 352, 354 (1958).
87. Edelstein v. Goldstein, No. CIV.A.09C-05-034DCS, 2011 WL 721490, at *7 (Del.
Super. Mar. 1, 2011).
88. Yavar v. Roffman, No. CV S14L-12-035 MJB, 2015 WL 5167930, at *6.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 6.
91. Id.
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personally liable for failing to disclose the true condition of a residence that
the LLC sold.
92
During a renovation of the property, “Geiser ‘became
aware of certain defects . . . , which included mold, mildew, current water
intrusion, damage to the structure from prior water intrusion, and defects in
the windows, roof and deck that gave rise to the mold and water damage’”
and made “representations that concealed the problems.”
93
The trial court
concluded that the LLC, not the individual defendant, sold the residence
and that appellants failed to allege a breach of statutory or fiduciary duty.
The court stated that plaintiffs “failed to allege adequate facts to show that
Geiser actively participated in the tortious conduct as an individual” and
that personal liability could not be squared with the Complaint, which
suggested that Geiser “signed the allegedly false disclosures ‘as managing
member’” of the LLC.
94
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that defendants were
“attempting to escape liability by hiding behind the shield of their . . .
characters” as members of the LLC.
95
The appellate court, in turn, relied
on People v. Pacific Landmark, LLC,
96
to reverse the trial judge’s decision,
stating that “while managers of limited liability companies may not be held
liable for conduct of their companies merely because of their corporate
status, ‘they may nonetheless be held accountable . . . for their personal
participation in tortious or criminal conduct, even when performing their
duties as manager.’”
97
The Pacific Landmark court had issued a
preliminary injunction against the manager of the LLC for aiding and
abetting a nuisance, by permitting prostitution on the property.
98
The
manager “occupied a prominent and influential position at Pacific . . . [was]
thoroughly familiar with all of its operations and business . . . [and] had
full responsibility for and authority over the property where the nuisance
occurred.”
99
Thus, in cases involving fraud, which by definition involves
intentional misconduct, courts in the U.S. appear willing to hold individuals
acting on behalf of a firm liable if they engaged in the tortious activity. In
92. Rungtiwa v. Geiser, No. B281329, 2018 WL 6303780 (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 3,
2018).
93. Id. at *4.
94. Id. at *2.
95. Brief for Appellant at 33, Rungtiwa v. Geiser, No. B281329, 2018 WL 6303780
(Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 3, 2018).
96. People v. Pac. Landmark, LLC, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
97. Rungtiwa v. Geiser, No. B281329, 2018 WL 6303780, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 3,
2018).
98. Pac. Landmark, LLC, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 193.
99. Id. at 202.
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these cases, corporate law and tort law principles pair up well. Individuals
are held accountable for the harms caused by their wrongful behavior – that
they were acting as an agent is of no defense.
2. Negligence Causing Pure Economic Loss
As noted above and as a general principle, courts are reluctant to
allow recovery of pure economic loss for negligence. There are a number
of policy reasons for this reluctance. First, the rule prevents limitless,
disproportionate, and often speculative liability for unforeseeable economic
damages resulting from the negligence.
100
Justice Cardozo famously
addressed this concern in Ultramares v. Touche, where he warned of
extending “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time
to an indeterminate class.”
101
The second rationale is the “deeply rooted
jurisprudential belief that contract remedies are superior to tort remedies
for dealing with issues of economic loss.”
102
That is, “[a]pplication of
the economic loss doctrine to tort actions between commercial parties is . . .
[intended] to encourage the party best situated to assess the risk
of economic loss, the commercial purchaser, to assume, allocate, or insure
against that risk.”
103
Burgeoning this principle is the argument that “the
law of contract is better equipped than the law of tort to redress a buyer’s
financial disappointment when a deal turns out badly.”
104
A third less prominent argument for the rule concerns the normative
value of the tort system. Cases involving economic loss, while perhaps
resulting in unfair decisions where one party benefits at the other’s
expense, do not necessarily result in a social cost but “simply a transfer
payment -- a private cost to one but an equal private benefit to another.”
105
Furthermore, personal injury and property loss are qualitatively different.
Courts are thus wary of over-deterring non-negligent activities or activities
that are “otherwise efficiently deterred for the purpose of mitigating social
100. Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 542–43 (2009).
101. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
102. Amanda K. Esquibel, The Economic Loss Rule and Fiduciary Duty Claims:
Nothing Stricter than the Morals of the Marketplace, 42 VILL. L. REV. 789, 793 (1997).
103. Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedar Rapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Wis. 1998);
Johnson, supra note 100, at 545.
104. Ward Farnsworth, The Economic Loss Rule, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 545, 553 (2016).
105. Robert J. Rhee, A Production Theory of Pure Economic Loss, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
49, 62 (2010).
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cost.”
106
This may be especially true where other areas of the law already
provide adequate remedies.
107
Perhaps, unsurprisingly, the rule against recovery for pure economic
loss has faced widespread criticism. For example, scholars like Robert J.
Rhee note that “the practice which, in many instances, denies recovery for
pure economic loss in negligence cases is hard to reconcile with the
recovery for potentially large economic losses resulting from negligently
caused physical injury.”
108
In the modern world, where physical injuries
from a calamity or string of calamities can be staggering, drawing a
distinction between physical and economic injury based on the scope of
liability has become a tenuous position.
109
Furthermore, the argument
against the rule has grown stronger as economic damages have become
increasingly easier to foresee and, given the reliance of modern enterprise
on computerized transactions, are increasingly the only damages available
to injured parties.
110
In part because of the competing views and scholarly debate, efforts to
create a single general theory for the economic loss rules have failed.
Rather, the “mass of precedent relating to tort liability
for economic loss has yet to be disentangled and expressed with the clarity
commonly found with respect to other tort law topics.”
111
Instead, “courts
usually proceed in the field of economic negligence by establishing discrete
pockets of liability that are not connected to general principles.”
112
The
result is a highly fact-intensive and situation specific endeavor with an
increased focus on the foreseeability of the damages, the intent and
culpability of the parties involved, and the duty, if any, owed by the
tortfeasor to the tort victim.
113
The exceptions to the economic loss rule tend to involve cases of
intentional misconduct
114
or, with regard to negligent misrepresentation,
cases where the injured party is justified in relying on the provider of
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort
Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 126 (1998).
109. Id.
110. Rhee, supra note 105, at 52.
111. Johnson, supra note 100, at 536.
112. Mark P. Gergen, The Ambit of Negligence Liability for Pure Economic Loss, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 749 (2006).
113. Id.; Johnson, supra note 100, at 555.
114. Johnson, supra note 100, at 529.
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information.
115
An example would be where a tortfeasor provides
information or services to a principal but knows that it will ultimately be
used for the sake of the third party.
116
Thus, as a general matter, negligent
misrepresentation effectively falls into an exception to the economic loss
rule. According to §552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
117
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) . . . [T]he liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss
suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for
whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the
information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it;
and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends
the information to influence or knows that the recipient so
intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
118
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION § 552 (AM.
LAW INST. 1977).
116. See, e.g., Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 287
(Pa. 2005) (holding the economic loss rule did not bar recovery where an architecture firm
had provided inaccurate measurements to a contractor and reliance on such measurements
caused foreseeable harm to the contractor’s client).
117. Guardian Constr. Co. v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378 (Del. Super.
1990).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION § 552 (AM.
LAW INST. 1977). Some courts have further stated that he or she must establish: (1) “the
defendant supplied the information to the plaintiff for use in business transactions with third
parties” and (2) “the defendant is in the business of supplying information.” Christana
Marine Servs. Corp. v. Texaco Fuel and Marine Mktg. Inc, C.A. No. 98C-02-217WCC,
2002 WL 1335360, at *6 (Del. Super. June 13, 2002). See also,Milsboro Fire Co. v. Constr.
Mgmt. Serv., C.A. No. 05C-06-137MMJ, 2006 WL 1867705, at *2 (Del. Super. June 7,
2006) (holding the defendant liable only if she is in the business of supplying information
and supplied information for use in transactions with a third party). In Delaware Art
Museum v. Ann Beha Architects, Inc., Civ. No 06-481, 2007 WL 2601472 (D. Del. Sept. 11,
2007), for example, recovery under the exception to the economic loss rule was barred
because defendant engineers who had provided plans and specifications as a consultant for
the renovation and expansion of the museum, were not in the business of supplying
information within the scope of §522. “To determine whether a defendant is in the business
of supplying information, a court must conduct a case-specific inquiry, looking into the
102 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 22:1
However, as demonstrated by the following decisions, it appears that
even if the above requirements are met for establishing liability for
negligent misrepresentation, courts are reluctant to hold corporate
executives liable to third parties in their individual capacity for the
economic damages incurred. Instead, courts tend to find the duty of the
officer, director, or principal, runs to the entity for which they work, and
not to the party harmed by their actions.
For example, in United States Liability Insurance Co. v. Haidinger-
Hayes, an insurance company brought a negligence action against the
corporation, Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., a licensed insurance agent and the
corporation’s president and principal executive officer, Mr. Haidinger, in
California.
119
The defendant corporation had the authority to solicit and
underwrite proposals for insurance, to determine the premium rate, and to
issue contracts of insurance on plaintiff’s behalf.
120
Plaintiff alleged
negligence against both the corporation and the individual officer, V.M.
Haidinger, in the computation of the premium rate of the policy. The trial
court agreed. The California Supreme Court, however, found that although
evidence was sufficient to allege the negligence of the defendants, the
defendant officer could not be held personally liable. The court stated that
“actionable negligence involves a legal duty to use due care, a breach of
such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the
resulting injury.”
121
Notably, the court remarked that “liability imposed
upon agents for active participation in tortious acts of the principal have
been mostly restricted to cases involving physical injury, not pecuniary
harm, to third persons”
122
and thus found the only duty owed by Mr.
Haidinger was to the corporation. It held:
[M]ore must be shown than [the] breach of the officer’s duty [t]o
his corporation to impose personal liability [t]o a third person
upon him. Neither the evidence nor the findings support the
conclusion that defendant V.M. Haidinger was personally liable
to plaintiff by reason of his negligent performance of his
nature of the information and its relationship to the kind of business conducted.” Delaware
courts have found a defendant in the business of supplying information when “information
is the end and aim product of a defendant’s work.” When, however, the “information
supplied is merely ancillary to the sale of a product or service . . . defendant will not be
found to be in the business of supplying information.”
119. United States Liab. Ins. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 463 P.2d 770, 771 (Cal. 1970).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 594.
122. Id.
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corporate duties.
123
Another California case involving pecuniary (rather than physical)
harm similarly highlights the critical distinction between duty to
corporation and duty to third party. In Self-Insurers’ Security Fund v. Esis,
Inc., plaintiff fund sued the former vice president of an insolvent employer,
California Canners and Growers (CCG), alleging negligent
misrepresentation to recover worker’s compensation benefits.
124
The
complaint alleged that the president (1) falsely estimated CCG’s workers’
liabilities, (2) knew that such estimates would be relied upon, (3) “actively
ordered, participated in and authorized the tort” and (4) “knew or
reasonably should have known that if CCG became insolvent CCG’s
employees would be injured” by the estimates.
125
Here, the court noted that
there are:
Two traditional limits on a corporate officer’s personal liability
for negligence as set forth in United States Liab., namely (1) “the
oft-stated disinclination to hold an agent personally liable for
economic losses when, in the ordinary course of his duties to his
own corporation, the agent incidentally harms the pecuniary
interests of a third party” (Francis T. v. Village Green Owners
Assn.) and (2) “the traditional rule that directors are not
personally liable to third persons for negligence amounting
merely to a breach of duty the officer owes to the corporation
alone.”
126
The court concluded that the officer did not owe a duty of care to
CCG’s employees. Instead, it found that the president’s conduct
allegedly resulting in pecuniary harm to CCG employees, was
not directed in any fashion towards, or in response to, the
employees. By signing and submitting the Reports to the
department, [the president] was acting solely in the scope and
course of his employment for and on behalf of CCG in
connection with its statutory reporting obligations. It was by
virtue of his status as an officer of CCG, and for no other reason,
that [the president] signed and attested to the Reports. . . . No
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation lies against [the
president] in his individual capacity.
127
123. Id.
124. Self-Insurers’ Sec. Fund v. Esis, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 3d 1148 (1988).
125. Id. at 1161.
126. Id. at 1162.
127. Id. at 1163.
104 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 22:1
Similarly, in 2013, a California Court of Appeal ruled in favor of a
corporate officer who argued that those in his position “are not personally
liable for negligence when they make decisions in the course and scope of
their duties to the corporation that incidentally cause economic harm to a
third party but do not cause physical harm or property damage.”
128
In this
case, the plaintiff corporation, Omnel, sued Mr. Tanner, the chief executive
officer and president of Tanner Industries, a California corporation and an
owner involved in “the management and operation of Valpo-LLC,”
129
in his
personal capacity, for negligence in a commercial lease agreement. Omnel
alleged that Tanner “authorized, directed, and meaningfully participated in
the construction of the build-out and the other actions which delayed timely
completion,” violated applicable laws and regulations, and caused Omnel
to lose profits and business opportunities.
130
Further, Omnel alleged the
defendant owed a personal duty “‘to use ordinary care to prevent Omnel
from being harmed as a result of his individual negligence in making the
decisions and personally performing’ the alleged harmful acts.”
131
During construction, Tanner had “falsely advised Omnel that no
permits were required,” continued to build without permits, did not
complete the building to code, and relied on cost-cutting shortcuts.
132
Months later, after the City declined to issue a certificate of occupancy in
the absence of required permits, “Tanner responded that he had friends
with the City and that he would work it out.”
133
Eventually, the
construction failed to meet code and did not reach completion. The trial
court reasoned that “any duty owed by Tanner regarding the management
and operation of Tanner Industries and Valpo-LLC was owed to those
entities, not to Omnel.”
134
A result to the contrary would “eviscerate the
protection against individual liability that incorporation would otherwise
provide.”
135
The appellate court affirmed and relied on the Haidinger-
Hayes and Francis T. line of reasoning, distinguished negligence from
intentional torts, and emphasized that the plaintiff did not own nor occupy
the leasehold premises at any point. In considering Omnel’s assertion of
economic damages related to “lost profits and business opportunities,” the
128. Omnel v. Tanner, No. C070907, 2013 WL 3357886, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 3,
2013).
129. Id.
130. Id. at *3.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *2.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *3.
135. Id.
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court declined to hold Tanner liable. The court noted that the claim was
not for property damage or personal injury — instead, only economic
damages, and found Tanner:
[N]ot personally liable for economic damages caused by any
negligent acts he committed in the course and scope of his
corporate duties. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of
limited liability and unravel the balance our high court has struck
between shielding corporate officers from personal liability when
their negligent decisions cause economic harm and protecting
third parties who suffer physical injuries or property damage.
136
Yet again, in Mansha Consulting LLC v. Alakai, a federal trial court in
Hawaii considered a negligence claim for economic damages.
137
This
claim alleging mishandling of invoice payments was brought against
Hawaii Health Connector (HHC), the chairman of its board, and its interim
executive director. Consistent with the rulings in California, the court
distinguished between the duty owed to the corporation and a duty of care
owed to a third party. In granting a motion to dismiss, the court noted that
the plaintiff consulting agency failed to show that the individual defendants
owed a duty to Mansha independently recognized by principles of tort law
and independent of the contract between them. In the court’s words, there
must be an assertion of a “duty or obligation, recognized by law, requiring
the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of
others against unreasonable risks.”
138
The complaint asserted that the
defendants owed certain duties given their roles at HHC, mainly to ensure
proper operation of the connector and responsibility for the overall
administration of the connector. The court cited the Restatement (Third) of
Agency that “[a]n agent is subject to tort liability to a third party harmed by
the agent’s conduct only when the agent’s conduct breaches a duty that the
agent owes to the third party.”
139
Finally, the court distinguished this case
from Frances T., which, “unlike the instant case, involved a duty of care to
avoid an unreasonable risk of physical injury . . . [and] included specific
allegations that directors were aware of a ‘hazardous condition’ that could
cause ‘physical injury’ to the plaintiff.”
140
From these cases it is evident that where the allegations of negligence
against corporate officers, directors, and principals involve pure economic
136. Id. at *6.
137. Mansha Consulting LLC v. Alakai, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1267 (D. Haw. 2017).
138. Id. at 1274.
139. Id. at 1275.
140. Id. at 1276.
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loss, courts in the U.S. are highly unlikely to find that the individuals owe a
duty of care to the third party, even when an exception to the economic loss
rule might allow recovery. There is already considerably less likelihood of
liability when the injury is economic as opposed to one involving personal
injury or property damage, regardless of who the defendant is. But where
the claim is for negligent misrepresentation, liability can be established
where the economic loss was caused by justifiable reliance upon the
information given in the context of a business transaction. Yet, this
analysis is typically not considered in actions brought by third parties
against officers, directors, or principals. Courts tend to foreclose analysis
of whether the reliance was justifiable, and instead find that these
individuals, effectively by virtue of their position within the firm, owe no
duty to third parties for economic loss.
Consider, for example, the Omnel case, where the president of the
company personally advised the plaintiff that no permits were required for
the project, and that he would work out any problems on that front with
friends he had in the city.
141
According to the court, these direct statements
to plaintiff imposed no personal duty but the court offered little analysis on
the point. The decision is questionable given that the facts appear to
engage a claim for negligent misrepresentation based on justifiable
reliance. That is, it would appear justifiable for the plaintiff to rely on the
individual defendant’s personal representations that he would solve any
problems regarding permits. This omission in the court’s analysis is
particularly puzzling given the active steps that the president seemingly
took to encourage the plaintiff to rely on him personally.
It is appropriate for courts to be wary of imposing undue liability on
corporate officers and directors. At risk is the evisceration of corporate law
principles and the danger that these individuals would otherwise be
required to backstop or guarantee corporate operations. The problem with
the cases discussed above, however, is that courts appear to be foreclosing
even the possibility that the director or officer would owe an individual or
personal duty to third parties. It is true that status alone should not result in
liability but it is also important that courts advance accountability and
reduce the problem of moral hazard. Tort law carves out an exception to
the rather harsh economic loss rule for negligent misrepresentation where
the harm caused to the plaintiff is foreseeable and where reliance on
information is justified. Yet, in the corporate context, courts, even in
California, appear not to consider foreseeability and justifiable reliance
141. Omnel v. Tanner, No. C070907, 2013 WL 3357886 (Cal. Ct. App. July 3, 2013).
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when deciding whether corporate officers, directors, or principals may be
held liable for negligence to third parties. Put another way, courts seem to
have concluded that the duty of these individuals runs only to the firm.
Furthermore, with regard to a duty to the firm, the potential liability of
these individuals is practically non-existent. As discussed in Part I above,
there is effectively no liability to the corporate entity for simple negligence,
and where the tortfeasor is a director, it is unlikely liability will ensue for
even acts of gross negligence.
Instead, rather than simply exonerating officers and directors from
liability to third parties for negligent misrepresentation, essentially a
corporate law framework, courts could instead apply general tort law. This
would entail a consideration of whether the defendant failed to exercise due
care when providing the information and whether the plaintiff was justified
in relying on that information. An example is presented by the New York
Court of Appeals case of Kimmell v. Schaefer.
142
In this case, plaintiffs
invested in a partnership that “provid[ed] heat and electricity to industrial
and commercial energy users through on-site gas-powered ‘cogeneration’
units.”
143
In soliciting support, the defendant (a lawyer, certified public
accountant, former chief financial officer of Pepsico for twenty-six years,
and current board member of the limited partnership) misrepresented the
“potential rate of return” on the investment, in a memo directed to the
plaintiffs. The memo failed to account for “recent and substantial change
in local utility rates.”
144
Notably, the projections were “generated for the
express purpose of providing investors with current information about
potential returns on the project” and the defendant received a commission
for his solicitation efforts.
145
The lower court found that the defendant “had
negligently misrepresented, both directly and by encouraging plaintiffs to
rely on the projections . . . that the . . . project would earn income, and that
plaintiffs relied on this misrepresentation to their detriment.”
146
It also
found the “existence of a special relationship sufficiently resembling
privity to justify holding [the] defendant liable.”
147
The Appellate Division
affirmed, holding the defendant liable for negligent misrepresentation. The
Court of Appeals stated that under New York law, “liability for negligent
misrepresentation has been imposed only on those persons who possess
142. Kimmell v. Schaefer, 675 N.E.2d 450, 452 (1996).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 453.
145. Id. at 454.
146. Id. at 453.
147. Id.
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unique or specialized expertise, or who are in a special position of
confidence and trust with the injured party such that reliance on the
negligent misrepresentation is justified.”
148
Furthermore,
[w]hether the nature and caliber of the relationship between the
parties is such that the injured party’s reliance on a negligent
misrepresentation is justified generally raises an issue of fact. In
determining whether justifiable reliance exists in a particular
case, a fact finder should consider whether the person making the
representation held or appeared to hold unique or special
expertise; whether a special relationship of trust or confidence
existed between the parties; and whether the speaker was aware
of the use to which the information would be put and supplied it
for that purpose. The record here contains ample support for the
finding that defendant’s relationship with plaintiffs gave rise to a
duty to speak with care.
149
This duty approach to negligence causing pure economic loss
represented in Kimmell, and as articulated by Section 552 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, offers a fair compromise between tort law
and corporate law values. On one hand, it is important that directors and
officers are not treated as backstopping corporate obligations via tort law.
On the other hand, if the director or officer takes steps that establish
justifiable reliance by the plaintiff on the director or officer, liability should
follow. The Kimmel court’s conclusion also resonates with a persuasive
approach taken in a significant Canadian case on point, a matter explored in
the next part.
II. CORPORATEDIRECTOR ANDOFFICER LIABILITY TONON-
SHAREHOLDER THIRD PARTIES INCANADA
Like American law, Canadian law faces a dilemma when tort law and
corporate law collide in relation to director and officer tortious liability to
third parties. According to Justice Le Dain in Mentmore Manufacturing
Co. v. National Merchandise Manufacturing Co.:
150
What is involved here is a very difficult question of policy. On
the one hand, there is the principle that an incorporated company
is separate and distinct in law from its shareholders, directors and
148. Id. at 454.
149. Id.
150. Mentmore Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Merch. Mfg. Co. (1978), 89 D.L.R. 3d 195 (Can. Fed.
Ct.).
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officers, and it is in the interests of the commercial purposes
served by the incorporated enterprise that they should as a
general rule enjoy the benefit of the limited liability afforded by
incorporation. On the other hand, there is the principle that
everyone should answer for his tortious acts.
151
On a related front, the Alberta Court of Appeal has recently opined as
follows: “Finding representatives of corporations personally liable for torts
engages competing policy objectives. One policy objective of the law of
torts is the compensation of injured persons. A competing policy objective
of corporate law is the limitation of personal liability for corporate acts.”
152
As will be seen, Canadian law is united in finding directors and
officers personally liable in relation to torts causing death, personal injury,
or property loss. However, Canadian law is more divided in result when
the tort at bar is simple negligence causing pure economic loss.
A. Torts Causing Death, Personal Injury, and Property Loss
Directors and officers are subject to ordinary tort law in relation to
negligence causing death, personal injury, and property loss. In such
serious circumstances, courts have rightly concluded that corporate law
values have no residual influence.
For example, in Lewis v. Boutilier, a 1919 decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada, at issue was the personal liability of the company
president (Mr. Lewis) in negligence for the death of a fourteen-year-old
boy whom he had instructed to work in a dangerous area of a sawmill.
153
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed as irrelevant any controversy as to
whether Mr. Lewis or Mr. Lewis’s company was the child’s employer. As
Justice Mignault observed, even if the boy had been employed by Mr.
Lewis’s company (as opposed to by Mr. Lewis himself), an action would
lie against Mr. Lewis personally for putting “the boy at a dangerous work
without proper safeguards to protect him from mishap.”
154
As Judge
Idington wrote in the same decision: “The sooner presidents of companies
realize that they have duties, the better for themselves and their fellow
men.”
155
Lewis was more recently cited with approval by the Ontario Court
151. Id. at 202.
152. Hall v. Stewart, 2019 ABCA 98, para. 13 (Can. Alta.).
153. Lewis v. Boutilier (1919), 52 D.L.R. 383, 389 (Can.). The boy slipped or was
otherwise pulled into a cogwheel and was killed. Id. at 390.
154. Id. at 393.
155. Id. at 386.
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of Appeal in ADGA Systems International Ltd. v. Valcom Ltd.
156
in 1999.
A similar analysis holds when the plaintiff sues an officer or director
for personal injury. In Berger v. Willowdale A.M.C.,
157
at issue was the
corporate president’s personal liability to the plaintiff employee who
slipped on ice and was injured. Though aspects of this case involved the
law going to workers’ compensation legislation, the court recognized more
generally and based on Lewis that both the corporation and the executive
officer can owe a duty of care to the plaintiff in such circumstances. That
the relevant legislation permitted such concurrency of actions in turn
reflected important policy considerations including: that the corporate
president has “great power over his employees;”
158
that there is “a natural
desire on the part of an employee to please persons in authority in the
employer corporation,”
159
particularly in a small corporation;
160
and that to
the employee “the president is the symbol of job security and the source of
possible promotion.”
161
Taken together, this means that the corporate
officer has a personal duty to show “due regard”
162
for employee safety as
employees might be too wary to complain about various circumstances. In
short, such an officer “cannot ignore a dangerous condition of which he is
aware or should be. This is true particularly if he is in control of the
situation and has available the means to rectify it.”
163
In coming to this
conclusion, that court rejected defendant counsel’s floodgates argument as
being in terrorem and without foundation,
164
stating that executive liability
will depend on factors including:
[T]he size of the company, particularly the number of employees
and the nature of the business; whether or not the danger or risk
was or should have been readily apparent to the executive
officer; the length of time the dangerous situation was or should
have been apparent to the executive officer; whether that officer
had the authority and ability to control the situation and whether
he had ready access to the means to rectify the danger.
165
156. ADGA Sys. Int’l Ltd. v. Valcom Ltd. (1999), 43 O.R. 3d 101, para. 19 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
157. Berger v. Willowdale A.M.C. (1983), 41 O.R. 2d 89 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
158. Id. at para. 42.
159. Id. at para. 40.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at para. 42.
163. Id.
164. Id. at para. 44.
165. Id.
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Berger has more recently been cited with approval by the Ontario
Court of Appeal.
166
Other Canadian jurisdictions follow an identical analysis. In a 2019
decision, the Alberta Court of Appeal in Hall v. Stewart determined that the
defendant director was liable for negligently causing personal injury to the
plaintiff-employee on a work site.
167
Noting that there is clearly a duty of
care to avoid injuring one’s co-workers and no policy basis for excluding
that duty, the court concluded that “the modern corporation was not
designed to be a method of providing immunity to corporate actors for this
sort of loss. There are strong public policy reasons to ensure that
physically injured plaintiffs are compensated. Claims for pure economic
loss raise different issues.”
168
In a similar vein, directors and officers face personal liability for
negligence causing property damage, as confirmed by the Supreme Court
of Canada as recently as 2014. In Peracomo Inc. v. TELUS
Communications Co.,
169
Canada’s highest court very clearly adopted the
principle that corporate personality matters not when assessing duty in such
a context. Put another way, “corporate officers and directors may be held
liable in their personal capacity where they negligently cause property
damage in the course of their corporate duties.”
170
As a result, the
individual defendant’s status as an officer of the corporate defendant could
not dislodge his personal liability for recklessly cutting a fiber-optic cable
and causing almost $1 million in damages to the plaintiff.
171
He was found
to owe personally a duty of care to the plaintiff which was breached when
he cut the cable.
172
The same judicial perspective is present in the context of personal
liability for nuisance. In the New Brunswick Court of Appeal of Desrosiers
166. ADGA, 43 O.R. at para. 20.
167. Hall v. Stewart, 2019 ABCA 98, para. 25 (Can. Alta.). Note that this case involved
workers’ compensation legislation but the legislative context did not change the court’s
reasoning on this particular point.
168. Id. at para. 23. See also Nielsen Estate v. Epton, 2006 ABCA 382, para. 21 (Can.
Alta.), wherein the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s finding that the corporate
director owed a personal duty of care in the context of extreme director misconduct causing
a worksite death. Note that this case engaged, inter alia, occupational health and safety
legislation.
169. Peracomo Inc. v. TELUS Communications Co., [2014] 1 S.C.R. 621 (Can.). Note
that this case also involved application of the Marine Insurance Act, SC 1993, c 22 and the
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976.
170. Id. at para. 16.
171. Id. at para. 2, 17.
172. Id. at para. 17.
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v. Sullivan,
173
the plaintiff sued both the corporate owner of a hog farm
operation and Mr. Sullivan, its shareholder/manager/principal employee.
At issue was liability for odors on the plaintiff’s land caused by a manure
lagoon on the hog farm.
174
The court found both the corporation and the
individual liable in nuisance, stating as follows:
Nor am I attracted to the submission that Mr. Sullivan is
protected by reason of the rule in Salomon v. Salomon & Co.,
[1897] A.C. 22. The question here, as I have pointed out, is not
whether Mr. Sullivan was acting on behalf of or even if he
“was” the company, but whether a legal barrier, here a company,
can be erected between a person found to be a wrongdoer and an
injured party thereby relieving the wrongdoer of his liability. In
my opinion, once it is determined that a person breaches a duty
owed to neighbouring landowners not to interfere with their
reasonable enjoyment of their property, liability may be imposed
on him and he may not escape by saying that as well as being a
wrongdoer he is also a company manager or employee.
175
Sullivan, too, has more recently been cited by the Ontario Court of
Appeal.
176
In sum, corporate law has no mitigating influence on personal liability
in the context of tort actions involving death, personal injury, as well as
damage to property or its reasonable enjoyment. On the contrary,
Canadian law recognizes that individuals have certain foundational and
mandatory legal obligations which the corporate vehicle does not absorb or
otherwise annul.
B. Torts Causing Pure Economic Loss
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss all possible torts which
may cause pure economic loss. Instead, three more common examples are
selected for discussion, namely fraudulent misrepresentation, the tort of
inducing breach of contract, and negligence causing pure economic loss.
173. Desrosiers v. Sullivan (1986), 76 N.B.R. 2d 271 (Can.), leave to appeal to the SCC
denied (S.C.C. 4 June 1987).
174. Id. at para 2.
175. Id.
176. ADGA, 43 O.R. at para. 21.
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1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Directors and officers in Canada are personally liable to third parties
for fraud,
177
with the presence of a corporation being irrelevant to the
analysis. In Midwest Amusement Park, LLC v. Cameron Motorsports
Inc.,
178
for example, the individual director was found personally liable,
inter alia, for fraudulent misrepresentation, with the court simply applying
ordinary tort law principles to reach this uncontroversial conclusion.
179
On
the same footing, the corporation behind which the director stood was also
found responsible. Though some courts also go on to discuss the corporate
veil in situations involving fraud or other improper purpose
180
the result is
the same—personal liability on the director or officer. Accordingly, this
Article does not discuss the corporate veil cases and their complexities.
181
The point is that—directly or indirectly—tort law values justifiably prevail
in relation to fraud and other forms of improper conduct. The importance
of personal accountability is paramount and the involvement, in addition,
of a corporation does not change that analysis.
177. The test for civil fraud has recently been described as follows by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Bruno Appliance & Furniture, Inc. v. Hryniak, [2014] 1 S.C.R 126 (Can.),
para 21: “(1) [A] false representation made by the defendant; (2) some level of knowledge
of the falsehood of the representation on the part of the defendant (whether through
knowledge or recklessness); (3) the false representation caused the plaintiff to act; and (4)
the plaintiff’s actions resulted in a loss.”
178. Midwest Amusement Park, LLC v. Cameron Motorsports Inc., [2018] ONSC 4549
Can.). A director’s or officer’s personal liability for fraud is also expressly recognized in
Scotia McLeod v. Peoples Jewelers Ltd., [1995] 26 O.R. 3d 481, 490–91 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
179. Midwest Amusement Park, LLC v. Cameron Motorsports Inc., [2018] ONSC 4549
(Can.), para. 87.
180. For example, in Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club,
2000 ABCA 116, aff’d [2002] 1 S.C.R 678 (Can.), the Alberta Court of Appeal accepted
the trial judge’s finding that the individual defendant had been “fraudulent, dishonest, and
deceitful” and went on to note that such findings “provide the necessary support for lifting
the corporate veil. As the corporate veil cannot be used as a shield for misconduct, or fraud,
liability may be extended to the principals of the corporation where they have engaged in
this type of conduct . . . .” Id. at para. 93. See also Jin v. Ren, [2015] ABQB 115 (Can.),
para. 71–81, aff’d 2016 ABCA 80 (Can.), leave to appeal to SCC denied 37023 (13 October
2016).
181. See Spring Garden Holdings Ltd. v. Ryan Duffy’s Restaurants Ltd., [2010] NSSC
71 (Can.) for a comprehensive discussion of the corporate veil; see alsoMohamed Khimji &
Christopher Nicholls, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Canadian Common Law Courts – An
Empirical Study, 14 QUEEN’S L.J. 207 (2015).
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2. Inducing Breach of Contract (or Interference with Contractual
Relations)
Directors and officers can be personally liable for the tort of inducing
breach of contract,
182
which typically involves the director or officer
inducing her own corporation to breach its contract with a third party by,
for example, wrongfully terminating an employee.
183
Importantly, this tort
is subject to what is called the defense of Said v. Butt.
184
Said v. Butt
concludes that a director or officer has no personal liability for inducing the
corporation’s breach of contract provided that the director (or officer or
other agent) is acting “bona fide within the scope of his authority.”
185
In
this way, the agency roots of the rule in Said v. Butt come to the fore as
corporate law values, giving recognition to the fact that corporations must
act through directors and officers who, ordinarily, are not parties to the
contract at issue. If the tort of inducing breach of contract were too easily
established, the plaintiff would be permitted to wrongfully escape the
confines of contract and have an extra party to sue. The defense of Said v.
Butt therefore protects the director or officer for reasons of public policy.
And as the Ontario Court of Appeal expresses the matter, the Said v. Butt
defense:
[A]ssures that persons who deal with a limited company and
accept the imposition of limited liability will not have available
to them both a claim for breach of contract against a company
and a claim for tortious conduct against the director with
damages assessed on a different basis. The exception also
assures that officers and directors, in the process of carrying on
business, are capable of directing that a contract of employment
be terminated or that a business contract not be performed on the
assumed basis that the company’s best interest is to pay the
182. ADGA, 43 O.R. at para. 34–35.
183. The tort is comprised of the following elements according to 369413 Alberta Ltd v.
Pocklington, 2000 ABCA 307, para.13(Can.): i) the existence of a contract; ii) knowledge or
awareness by the defendant of the contract; iii) a breach of the contract by a contracting
party; iv) the defendant induced the breach; v) the defendant, by his conduct, intended to
cause the breach; vi) the defendant acted without justification; and vii) the plaintiff suffered
damages. See also Super-Save Enterprises Ltd. v. 249513 B.C. Ltd. (c.o.b. Mike’s Auto
Towing), [2004] BCCA 183, para.2 (Can.).
184. Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 KB 487 (Eng.).
185. As the English court stated in Said v. Butt: “if a servant acting bona fide within the
scope of his authority procures or causes the breach of a contract between his employer and
a third person, he does not thereby become liable to an action of tort at the suit of the person
whose contract has thereby been broken.” Id. at 506.
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damages for failure to perform. By carving out the exception for
these policy reasons, the court has emphasized and left intact the
general liability of any individual for personal conduct.
186
On the other side of the coin, the defense of Said v. Butt cannot apply
when directors have used their powers “for an improper purpose.”
187
An
illustrative decision is McFadyen v. 481782 Ontario Ltd.
188
wherein the
plaintiff successfully sued the corporate directors personally for inducing
the corporate employer to wrongfully dismiss him.
189
The entire context
was suspect, including that -- just prior to firing the plaintiff -- the directors
transferred the contents of the corporation’s bank account to themselves
personally.
190
The court found that the directors, via the wrongful
dismissal, had induced the corporation to breach of contract with the
plaintiff.
191
It found no justification or availability of the defense in Said v.
Butt. The directors were not acting bona fide with a view to the best
interests of the corporate defendant but were, rather, in the words of the
trial judge, seeking to “feather their own nest,” not fulfill their duty to serve
the corporate defendant.
192
This kind of misconduct (including asset
stripping) is an example of the personal advantage-seeking which regularly
features in the relevant case law.
193
Thus far, discussion of Canadian law regarding the personal liability
of directors and officers shows that directors and officers are personally
liable for negligence causing death and injury as well as property loss.
They are also personally liable for committing intentional torts like fraud
and inducing breach of contract subject to the defense of Said v. Butt. In
many of the cases explored in this section, the court assessed corporate law
arguments by which directors and officers sought to be sheltered from the
consequences of tort law. The cases conclude, however, that corporate law
principles have no influence where the plaintiff has been killed, injured or
had her property damaged due to the actions of the director/officer
defendant. In such circumstances, the director’s personal duties survive
Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Likewise, when the director commits a fraud or
induces breach of contract without justification, corporate law values also
186. ADGA, 43 O.R. at para. 15.
187. KEVIN MCGUINNESS, 2 CANADIAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS LAW 737-38 (3
rd
ed.
2017).
188. McFadden v. 481782 Ontario Ltd, [1984], 47 O.R. 2d 134 (Can. Ont. S.C.).
189. Id. at para. 1.
190. Id. at para. 22.
191. Id. at para. 42.
192. Id.
193. MCGUINNESS, supra note 187, at 739.
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justifiably fade. This is because the director has been acting self-
interestedly and even corruptly and should have personal liability for such
conduct.
3. Negligence Causing Pure Economic Loss
Unlike the law discussed above, directors’ and officers’ personal
liability for simple (or ordinary) negligence causing pure economic loss is
considerably less settled in Canada. As Slatter J.A. of the Alberta Court of
Appeal observed more generally in Hogarth v Rocky Mountain Slate:
The law respecting the liability of directors and officers for torts
committed while conducting corporate business is not entirely
consistent. Some cases approach the problem from the
perspective of the “duty of care”, whereas others approach it
from the perspective of “piercing the corporate veil.” Some
exceptions to general liability for tort have been recognized, and
others have been rejected, without any clear principle
emerging.
194
Indeed, the law appears to split into two established, competing lines
of authority, a very new third line, and possibly even a fourth. As will be
discussed, the first line of authority seems to favor corporate law values,
the second line seems to favor tort law values, while a new line is located
somewhere in between. To add to the complexity, an apparent fourth line
of authority reinterprets how the first line of authority should be
understood. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to give a thorough,
multi-jurisdictional account of how this area of law is regarded across
Canada, it does select a number of important cases for discussion and
illumination.
a. The First Line of Authority: ScotiaMcLeod Inc. v. Peoples
Jewelers Ltd. and the Corporate Veil Approach
The first line of authority appears to support the conclusion that
directors and officers are not liable for simple negligence causing pure
economic loss and is represented by ScotiaMcLeod Inc. v. Peoples
Jewellers Ltd., a 1995 decision from the Ontario Court of Appeal.
195
In
194. Hogarth v. Rocky Mountain Slate Inc., 2013 ABCA 57, para. 73 (Can. Alta. C.A.),
leave to appeal to the S.C.C. denied (S.C.C. Apr. 16, 2013).
195. ScotiaMcLeod Inc. v. Montreal Trust Co. of Canada (1995), 26 O.R. 3d 481 (Can.
Ont. C.A.), leave denied, 205 N.R. 314 (S.C.C.A. No. 40 1996).
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ScotiaMcLeod, the plaintiff investor purchased senior unsecured debentures
issued by the defendant corporation, Peoples Jewelers. Disappointed with
the investment, the plaintiff sued the defendant underwriters
(ScotiaMcLeod) for negligent misrepresentation, alleging that the
prospectus and other documents related to the investment were deficient.
At the heart of the matter for our purposes was that the underwriters
brought a third party claim against the board of Peoples, alleging personal
liability for negligent misstatement in relation to the impugned
documentation.
196
In reply to being third partied, the directors brought a
motion to dismiss the claim against them as disclosing no reasonable cause
of action.
197
What follows is the Court of Appeal’s most important and
often quoted pronouncement regarding personal liability of directors and
officers in tort:
The decided cases in which employees and officers of companies
have been found personally liable for actions ostensibly carried
out under a corporate name are fact-specific. In the absence of
findings of fraud, deceit, dishonesty or want of authority on the
part of employees or officers, they are also rare. . . . In every
case, however, the facts giving rise to personal liability were
specifically pleaded. Absent allegations which fit within the
categories described above, officers or employees of limited
companies are protected from personal liability unless it can be
shown that their actions are themselves tortious or exhibit a
separate identity or interest from that of the company so as to
make the act or conduct complained of their own (emphasis
added).
198
In referencing fraud, deceit, and dishonesty, the court appears to reach
for the corporate veil cases alluded to by Slatter J.A. in Hogarth above as
the touchstone for director and officer liability. Understanding
ScotiaMcLeod in relation to the corporate veil cases is expositive because it
explains why ScotiaMcLeod identifies fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and lack of
authority as hallmarks of liability to begin with. If all torts committed by
directors and officers were per se actionable, there would be no obvious
reason for the court to single out fraud, deceit and dishonesty at all.
In fact, ScotiaMcLeod appears to double-down on the notion that
196. Id. at para. 24.
197. Id. at para. 1.
198. Id. at para. 25 (emphasis added). This passage has most recently been cited with
approval by the Ontario Court of Appeal in McDowell v. Fortress Real Capital Inc., 2019
ONCA 71, para. 55, though the law in Ontario remains divided. See discussion infra pp. 36-
47.
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directors and officers have special protection in relation to torts committed
against third parties by invoking the directing mind theory. To do so, the
court relied, inter alia, on Lord Reid in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v.
Nattrass.
199
According to Lord Reid, the director does not simply act as
agent in conducting corporate business. Rather, he is “an embodiment of
the company . . . within his appropriate sphere.”
200
In the ordinary case,
therefore, the director acts for the corporation and his identity merges with
the corporation. Any tortious conduct by the director is attributed to the
corporation who has primary liability for the tort.
201
Crucially, however,
this tortious conduct does not place personal liability on directors unless
they step outside of their role and, for example, act fraudulently or
dishonestly. As the court in ScotiaMcLeod states:
Considering that a corporation is an inanimate piece of legal
machinery incapable of thought or action, the court can only
determine its legal liability by assessing the conduct of those who
caused the company to act in the way that it did. This does not
mean, however, that if the actions of the directing minds are
found wanting, that personal liability will flow through the
corporation to those who caused it to act as it did. To hold the
directors . . . personally liable, there must be some activity on
their part that takes them out of the role of directing minds of the
corporation.
202
ScotiaMcLeod’s reasonably extreme conditions for personal liability
would appear, on their face, to foreclose liability for ordinary negligence
causing economic loss—a conclusion that court itself indirectly endorses.
That is, in applying the law to the application to dismiss the claims against
the individual directors, the court in ScotiaMcLeod permitted claims in
simple negligence against two of the defendant directors to proceed but
only because the particulars against them had been pleaded. The court
expressed severe reservations as to the viability of the negligence action
itself but permitted it to continue on the basis that an action should not be
summarily dismissed at this early stage only because it is “novel”
203
and
“attempting to stretch the envelope of available jurisprudence.”
204
The
199. Id. at para. 29 (citing Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] AC 153, 170
(HL)).
200. Id.
201. See R. v. Canadian Dredge & Dock Co., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662 (Can.) (holding that
the conduct of a primary corporate representative is attributed to the company).
202. ScotiaMcLeod Inc., 26 O.R. at para. 26.
203. Id. at para. 39.
204. Id.
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court’s very clear implication is the claims for ordinary negligence were
seen as unlikely to pass the test posited by ScotiaMcLeod itself.
That said, the cases applying ScotiaMcLeod are numerous,
inconsistent, and difficult to organize. What immediately follows is an
analysis of certain cases which interpret ScotiaMcLeod as standing for the
proposition that director and officer liability to third parties is rare and tied
to more extreme misconduct. Subsection (b) below assesses examples of
cases which take a contrary view, namely that director and officer liability
to third parties is common and widely encompassing.
Craik v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Canada,
205
is an Ontario decision
which came out soon after ScotiaMcLeod and sought to apply it. Therein,
the court stated:
Qualifications or exceptions are necessary to the general
approach of corporate directors and officers not being
responsible for corporate actions. When an individual commits a
fraud or acts with malice, then the individual cannot hide behind
a corporation. There are many instances where the law allows a
piercing of the corporate veil. . . .When the director or officer is
acting outside the scope of his/her authority in being motivated
by advancing a personal interest contrary to the interest of his/her
corporation or when the director or officer is committing a fraud
or doing something with malice, the individual can be subject to
personal liability. Unless the claim against the director or officer
alleges fraud, bad faith, absence of authority, or a deliberate and
intentional act constituting an intentional tort or some other
exceptional circumstance whereby it can be said that the director
or officer has made the act complained of his own distinct,
personal act rather than the act of the operation, the claim should
be struck out at the pleading stage.
206
The judicial language here is centered on exceptional and egregious
misconduct as would permit lifting the corporate veil, such as the director
or officer committing fraud, acting maliciously, or acting in bad faith.
In Blacklaws v. Morrow,
207
the majority decision of the Alberta Court
of Appeal likewise appeared to take a restrictive approach to the question
of liability. It cited ScotiaMcLeod’s test regarding liability, quoted above,
205. Craik v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Canada, [1995] O.J. 3286 (Gen. Div.), aff’d
[1996] O.J. 2377 (Can.).
206. Id. at paras. 18–19 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
207. Blacklaws v. Morrow, 2000 ABCA 175, 187 D.L.R (4
th
) 614 (Can.), leave to
appeal to the SCC refused, 28126 (Apr. 19, 2001).
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with approval
208
and, significantly for our purposes, described
ScotiaMcLeod as concerning “whether someone has an immunity from
what would otherwise be a tort because he is an employee or director of a
company when he acts, or is doing the very essence of his employer’s
contractual duties” (emphasis added).
209
The Court of Appeal went on to
dismiss the negligence claim against the officer in question, however,
because, crucially, “we never get to the stage of discussing immunity from
tort because we find the elements to create personal tort are absent in the
circumstances of this case.”
210
In short, unless and until the plaintiff can
demonstrate a tort by the defendant, the question of whether the defendant
has an immunity from that tort is moot. But otherwise, the exercise
continues, with the test moving on to ask whether the director who has
committed the tort may nonetheless escape personal liability. The court is
to apply ScotiaMcLeod such that immunity is lost and liability flows if it is
established that the director’s actions “are themselves tortious or exhibit a
separate identity or interest from that of the company so as to make the act
or conduct complained of their own. . . .”
211
Following this interpretation, ScotiaMcLeod would seem to exclude
liability for a director’s simple negligence causing pure economic loss
because negligence does not exhibit a separateness (at least not in the way
that fraud, dishonesty, or want of authority does). See, for example, the
assessment by Justice Martin (now of the Supreme Court of Canada) in
Stewart v Enterprise Universal Inc., writing in the context of a case
involving personal injury allegedly arising from asbestos removal.
212
In her
decision, Justice Martin relied on ScotiaMcLeod (a case involving pure
economic loss) and the Alberta Court of Appeal’s assessment in Blacklaws
v. Morrow (a case involving pure economic loss) to conclude as follows:
The most fundamental principle of corporate law is that of
limited liability; see Salomon v. Salomon, [1897] A.C. 22. It is
clear that a corporation like Enterprise [a corporate defendant]
can only operate through its human agents, or what has become
known as its “directing mind”. However, the converse is not
true; meaning that the liability of Enterprise does not necessarily
208. Id. at para. 41. The majority decision of the Court of Appeal did not cite this
competing authority, namely ADGA Systems International Ltd. v. Valcom Ltd. (1999), 43
O.R. 3d 101 (Ont. C.A.). See infra Part III.B.3.b for discussion of ADGA.
209. Id. at para. 37 (emphasis added).
210. Id.
211. Id. at para. 41.
212. Stewart v. Enterprise Universal Inc., 2010 ABQB 259 (Can.). Note that Nielsen
Estate v. Epton, 2006 ABCA 382, cited in Stewart, involved a workplace fatality.
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flow through to its human agents, like the Directors. At law
there is a very strong presumption that a director in his/her
personal capacity is not responsible for harms done by his/her
corporation. The point is made well by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in [ScotiaMcLeod]. . . .
However, in extreme cases the corporate veil can be lifted to
impose personal liability on a director; see Kosmopoulos v.
Constitution Ins. Co. of Canada, (1987)[1987 CanLII 75 (SCC)]
1 S.C.R. 2, 34 D.L.R. (4
th
) 208. In Nielsen Estate v. Epton, 2006
ABCA 382 [(CanLII),] the Alberta Court of Appeal
acknowledged at para. 20 that, “[i]t is settled law that a corporate
director may have a personal duty of care and may be liable for
acts that are in themselves tortious.”. . . .Therefore, the legal test
is clear. The Directors in this case must either have done
something that is tortious in itself or have done something that is
independently tortious, such that they exhibited a separate
interest from Enterprise and in doing so made the tort their
own. . . .
213
In short, these cases and others
214
conclude that not all torts committed
by a director or officer are actionable, a conclusion seemingly shared by the
majority decision in the appellate case of Hogarth though this
interpretation is not without doubt. Hogarth concerned the liability, inter
alia, of an individual officer (Mr. Simonson) for negligent misstatement to
investors who claim to have lost their investment as a result of relying on
Simonson’s words.
215
The trial judge determined that Simonson owed a
duty of care based on there being a special relationship with the plaintiffs
and he was therefore personally liable according to the law of negligent
misstatement.
216
The Court of Appeal reversed, splitting into a majority
213. Stewart, 2010 ABQB 259 at paras. 59–60 and 63.
214. See Cherkas v. Shell Energy North America (Canada) Inc., 2019 ABQB 400, para.
26 (Can.) (“To summarize, companies can only act through people, and those people are not
personally liable for their acts on behalf of the companies they represent unless their acts are
so outside the ambit of their work and role that they are seen to be their personal acts and
not those of the company.”); McDonald & Bychkowski Ltd. (CMB Insurance Brokers) v.
Lougheed, 2015 ABQB 792, para. 29 (Can.) (“What must be alleged, is an overt act;
something that takes the owner or employee outside identification with the company.
Circumstances that might permit lifting the corporate veil or imposing joint liability might
also suffice. The Officer or Director has to exhibit a separate character or identity. . . .”).
215. Hogarth, 2013 ABCA at para. 16.
216. Id. at paras. 23–28. Note that in its most recent statement of the law, the SCC does
not use the language of “special relationship” in relation to the tort of negligent
misstatement (though it had done so in the past). Rather, it refers to whether or not a duty
of care exists. This is a point largely going to terminology and has no importance for the
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and concurring judgment. As will be discussed in more depth later, the
concurring judgment found that Simonson was not liable to the plaintiffs
because he did not owe them a duty of care.
217
Put another way, the
individual defendant had not committed a tort to begin with. The majority,
however, followed more complicated terrain. It applied the Alberta Court
of Appeal decision in Blacklaws (discussed earlier) which itself had applied
ScotiaMcLeod (also discussed earlier). The majority concluded that
Simonson was not liable for negligent misstatement because, echoing
ScotiaMcLeod’s language, Simonson’s conduct was not “tortious in itself”
nor did it exhibit “a separate identity or interest from that of . . . the
corporation.”
218
This is where a lack of clarity creeps in. Does the majority
mean that a tort was committed but it was not sufficiently separate within
the meaning of ScotiaMcLeod to ultimately be actionable or does it mean
that no tort was committed at all? Following Blacklaws, it apparently
means the former. This is because, and as Blacklaws instructs, before one
gets to the ScotiaMcLeod test of separateness, the court must determine
whether a tort has even taken place. Only if a tort has been established,
would the court then move to the question of “immunity” by applying
ScotiaMcLeod. That is, and as transpired in Blacklaws, the court never
reaches the stage of discussing immunity from tort unless the elements of a
personal tort are in place.
219
(Note that the concurring decision in Hogarth
is discussed in more depth in the following section of this Article.)
Regardless of its precise scope, however, ScotiaMcLeod clearly
manifests a judicial fear that, absent exculpating provisos to the application
of ordinary tort law principles, directors would be overexposed to liability,
at least in the context of pure economic loss. As Janis Sarra observes,
overexposure to tortious liability would be concerning on a number of
grounds, including: trenching on the principle that the corporation is a
separate legal entity;
220
eroding the benefits of incorporation by offering the
plaintiff a backdoor to personal liability;
221
and reducing the pool of
individuals willing to serve as a director.
222
Another concern is more
generally identified by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the case of ADGA,
purposes of this Article. See Deloitte & Touche v. Livent Inc., [2017] 2 S.C.R. 855 (Can.)
(conducting a duty of care analysis in evaluating the case).
217. Hogarth, 2013 ABCA 57 at para. 134.
218. Id. at para. 14.
219. Blacklaws v. Morrow, 2000 ABCA 175, para. 37 (Can.).
220. Sarra, supra note 6, at 67.
221. Id. at 67.
222. Id. See also ADGA, 43 O.R. at para. 9 (stating that directors may be driven away
from involvement in corporate business due to exposure to potential lawsuits).
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namely that directors and officers would be exposed to “ill-founded”
litigation and that such a concern merits attention “because business cannot
function efficiently if corporate officers and directors are inhibited in
carrying on a corporate business because of a fear of being inappropriately
swept into lawsuits. . . .”
223
The ScotiaMcLeod view of liability can be cast as generally consistent
in outcome with case law described in Part II A, including: Midwest
Amusement Park
224
(personal liability for fraud); McFadden
225
(personal
liability for the tort of inducing breach of contract); Lewis
226
(personal
liability for negligence causing death); Berger
227
(personal liability for
negligence causing personal injury); Peracomo
228
(personal liability for
negligence causing property loss) and Desrosiers
229
(personal liability for
nuisance). Using the language of ScotiaMcLeod, misconduct in these cases
can be understood or characterized as taking the director outside her role as
a directing mind and, in this specific sense, making the tort her own. Based
on case law referenced in this section, it would appear that simple
negligence causing pure economic loss is not captured, or at least not easily
captured by ScotiaMcLeod.
If this is true, the ScotiaMcLeod line of authority is arguably
problematic for being under-inclusive. By offering a broad shield of
protection to directors and officers in relation to ordinary negligence
causing pure economic loss, the decision creates moral hazard
230
and
thereby condones poor corporate culture. Put another way, directors who
have no accountability to third parties for ordinary negligence therefore
lack the ordinary incentives to be careful. In this way, the case runs afoul
of Checchia’s warning quoted in the introduction to this Article, namely
that the law not “reward unreasonable and unethical conduct and . . . deny
recovery to injured third parties with valid legal claims.”
231
Though
ScotiaMcLeod does not necessarily reward unethical conduct, it does
reward unreasonable conduct because unreasonable conduct is the very
definition of negligence. And it denies recovery to injured third parties
223. ADGA, 43 O.R. at para. 9.
224. Midwest Amusement Park, LLC v. Cameron Motorsports Inc., 2018 ONSC 4549
(Can. Ont.).
225. McFadden v. 481782 Ontario Ltd. (1984), 47 O.R. 2d 134 (Can. Ont. S.C.).
226. Lewis v. Boutilier, 1919 CanLII 535 (Can. S.C.).
227. Berger v. Willowdale A.M.C., 1983 CanLII 1820 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
228. Peracomo Inc. v. TELUS Communications Co,. [2014] 1 S.C.R. 621 (Can.).
229. Desrosiers v. Sullivan, [1986] N.B.J. No. 156 (Can. N.B. C.A.) (QL).
230. O’Byrne, Fraser & Philip, supra note 6, at 878.
231. Checchia, supra note 14, at 284.
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because—but for the ScotiaMcLeod caveats describe above—such
plaintiffs would otherwise succeed against the culpable director. In short,
ScotiaMcLeod elevates corporate law values at the expense of tort law
values going to accountability. And most seriously, ScotiaMcLeod is
problematic because it fails to align with the Supreme Court of Canada’s
subsequent pronouncement that directors can owe a duty of care to third
parties such as creditors.
232
b. The Second Line of Authority: ADGA Systems International
Ltd. v. Valcom Ltd. and the Uncontextualized Duty of Care
Approach
The appellate court decision of ADGA Systems International Ltd. v.
Valcom Ltd.
233
appears to offer a second line of authority out of Ontario.
Whereas ScotiaMcLeod stated the director and officer tortious liability to
third parties would be “rare,”
234
and that there must be some activity that
takes directors and officers outside their role as a directing mind, ADGA
stated the opposite. Carthy J.A. in ADGA regarded director and officer
liability as being entirely common, stating that the
consistent line of authority in Canada holds simply that, in all
events, officers, directors and employees of corporations are
responsible for their tortious conduct even though that conduct
was directed in a bona fide manner to the best interests of the
company, always subject to the Said v. Butt exception.
235
In short, under ADGA, directors and officers are always personally
responsible for the torts they commit—whether as the directing mind or
outside that scope—with one exception. That exception occurs when the
director or officer is able to successfully raise the defense of Said v. Butt,
which, in turn, only applies to the tort of inducing breach of contract.
236
At issue in ADGA was the personal liability of the director and senior
employees of Valcom Ltd. These individuals facilitated the commission of
a tort by their own corporation by convincing virtually all the employees of
ADGA, a competitor, to breach their contracts of employment and move to
232. Peoples Dep’t Stores Inc. v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 487–93 (Can.). For further
discussion, see O’Byrne, Fraser & Philip, supra note 6, at 885–87.
233. ADGA, 43 O.R. at para. 9.
234. ScotiaMcLeod, 26 O.R. at para. 25.
235. ADGA, 43 O.R. at para. 18.
236. Id. For a discussion of this tort, see supra notes 182–193 and accompanying text.
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Valcom Ltd. for employment there.
237
This constituted the tort of inducing
breach of contract by the corporation and was therefore actionable as
against the corporate defendant. In addition, the Court of Appeal found the
individual defendants personally liable for the same tort even though they
were indisputably acting for a corporate purpose.
238
It is very difficult to accept ADGA’s assertion that there is a consistent
line of authority in this area and that it was merely following ScotiaMcLeod
in ruling against the individual defendants. Indeed, ADGA’s claim has
been directly challenged both by scholars,
239
and members of the
judiciary.
240
Most recently, for example, Justice Marriott of the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench flatly rejected ADGA’s assessment on this point,
observing, instead, that ADGA “establishes a broader scope of personal
liability of corporate directors than ScotiaMcLeod because it does not call
for the ‘separate identity’ requirement.”
241
Fortunately for our immediate
purposes, this debate is not central. What does matter is that ADGA most
certainly posits an approach to personal liability that is expansive and
virtually without exception.
By making directors and officers broadly liable, the Ontario Court of
Appeal in ADGA sought to enforce the general principle that “individuals
are responsible for their own conduct.”
242
With little hesitation, the court
stated an all-encompassing rule of personal liability that includes liability
for ordinary negligence causing pure economic loss. Indeed, as
Christopher Nicholls observes with implicit concern, the rule stated in in
ADGA “could effectively insulate third parties from what ought properly to
be the practical consequences of their decision to deal with a limited
liability entity.”
243
More generally, ADGA is subject to the criticism that it
did not take proper account of corporate law values, focusing exclusively
on tort. Its pronouncement that that a broad rule of liability did not
237. Id. at para. 3.
238. Id. at para. 6. Note that the defense of Said v. Butt had no application since the
individuals were not inducing their own corporation to breach a contract; they were inducing
employees of another corporation to do so.
239. See, e.g., Christopher Nicholls, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors to
Third Parties, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 1, 19 (2001); Sarra, supra note 6, at 64; O’Byrne, Fraser &
Philip, supra note 6, at 872–73.
240. Hogarth, 2013 ABCA at para. 73 ((“The law respecting the liability of directors and
officers for torts committed while conducting corporate business is not entirely
consistent.”). See also Hall v. Stewart, 2019 ABCA 98, para. 18 (Can.) (stating that a
“comprehensive and integrated test remains elusive” regarding director and officer liability).
241. Rudichuk v. Genesis Land Dev. Corp., 2019 ABQB 132, para 18 (Can.).
242. See Hogarth, 2013 ABCA at para. 101.
243. Nicholls, supra note 239, at 37.
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compromise the Salomon principle rings particularly hollow. True, ADGA
insisted that it was merely holding directors liable for their own torts and
accordingly, “the corporate veil is not threatened and the Salomon principle
remains intact.”
244
However, as Justice Slatter of the Alberta Court of
Appeal states in the subsequent decision of Hogarth, such a pronouncement
may be true, but it is hardly a helpful distinction. Whether it is
done directly or indirectly, a finding of personal liability has an
impact on the limited liability features of corporations, and the
policy concerns are the same. . . . Holding an individual liable for
a tort committed directly in pursuit of the company’s business
amounts to requiring that individual to grant a personal guarantee
for the tort liabilities of the company.
245
ADGA is also problematic for incentivizing directors and officers to
act with undue caution out of fear for personal liability,
246
thereby
jeopardizing the best interests of the corporation. In sum, AGDA extracts
personal accountability at too high a price.
The difficulties posed by ADGA are manifest in the subsequent
Ontario Court of Appeal decision of NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc.
247
In this case, the VP of Finance, Mr. Melville, described the credit
worthiness of the Algoma Steel Corporation (Algoma) in the form of
“egregious, serious mis-statements.”
248
The loan was made but Algoma
quickly defaulted. In response, the bank sued Melville personally in
negligence, inter alia. In finding that Melville owed the bank a personal
duty of care (or was in a special relationship), neither the trial judge nor the
appellate court took into account corporate law values that may militate
against the finding of a duty nor did they robustly assess the extent to
which Melville assumed personal responsibility for his words. Rather, the
Court of Appeal, for example, made short work of the duty question,
244. ADGA, 43 O.R. at para. 10.
245. Hogarth, 2013 ABCA at para. 126.
246. As Edward Iacobucci notes in Unfinished Business: An Analysis of Stones
Unturned, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 39, 47 (2001): “Directors faced with personal liability face the
full brunt of any tort damage awards against them. Since they bear the costs from a tort
judgment in full, directors cannot diversify this risk. As a general proposition, individual
directors will be risk adverse. Faced with the possibility of a tort damage award, and
possibly uncertain tort is standards, risk-adverse directors may tend to take more care than is
efficient. Personal liability and risk aversion could lead to excessive caretaking by
directors.” See also Ronald Daniels, Must Boards Go Overboard? An Economic Analysis of
the Effects of Burgeoning Liability on the Role of Directors in Corporate Governance, 24
CAN. BUS. L.J. 229, 255 (1994); O’Byrne, Fraser & Philip, supra note 6, at 881.
247. NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc. (1999), 46 O.R. 3d 514 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
248. Id. at para. 58.
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stating:
Mr. Melville was Algoma’s Vice-President (Finance), Secretary
and Treasurer. He was the respondent’s contact at Algoma. He
held himself out as capable of making decisions on Algoma’s
behalf as it related to satisfying the respondent’s concerns about
its lack of security. He must have known that carelessness on his
part would result in a loss by the respondent. The trial judge
found that the appellant “would reasonably know and in fact did
know, that Mr. Hynes and his bank trusted him and would accept
and rely upon what he said to them”. This finding was amply
supported by the record. Thus, Mr. Melville ought reasonably to
have foreseen that the respondent would rely upon his
representations. . . . For virtually the same reasons, reliance by
the respondent was reasonable. . . .
249
To reiterate, the question that the court did not ask was the basis upon
which the bank reasonably relied on Melville as having assumed personal
responsibility for his negligent words as opposed to simply speaking on
behalf of the corporation. Instead, the Court of Appeal simply rejected any
policy reasons militating against finding a personal duty of care—since, for
example, there was no risk of indeterminate liability on the facts.
250
Accordingly, Melville was found personally liable to the bank, jointly and
severally with other named defendants, for the equivalent of $1,984,945.27
USD.
251
NBD Bank is problematic for too easily finding a duty of care and for
its failure, for example, to robustly assess all the circumstances. For
example, Justice Slatter in Hogarth implicitly critiqued NBD Bank when
observing that the bank “was obviously a sophisticated party, which knew
it was dealing with corporate structures that limited liability, and a
borrower under some financial stress.”
252
In this way, NBD Bank may well
have extended director and officer liability in negligence too far.
249. Id. at para. 48.
250. Id. at para. 59.
251. NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc. (1997), 34 B.L.R. 2d 209 (Can.). Note that the
Bank sued Melville for fraud as well but this was disallowed by the trial judge, who found
in negligence instead. Given that Melville’s misrepresentations were described by both
levels of court as “egregious,” perhaps the fraud route would have been more appropriate.
And a finding of personal liability in the context of fraud would have been entirely non-
controversial.
252. Hogarth, 2013 ABCA at para. 104.
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c. The Third Line of Authority: The Concurring Decision in
Hogarth v. Rocky Mountain Slate Inc. and the
Contextualized Duty of Care Approach
A third line of authority is germinated in the concurring decision of
the Alberta Court of Appeal in Hogarth
253
and one which addresses the
seeming deficiencies of the NBD Bank case. In Hogarth, Justice Slatter
stated that directors and officers could be liable for ordinary negligence to
third parties, thereby implicitly discarding ScotiaMcLeod, which holds to
the contrary. However, Slatter J.A. was nonetheless protective of directors
and officers because, following his approach, a duty of care (or special
relationship in the context of negligent misstatement) would be difficult to
establish in the ordinary case. The bright line Slatter J.A. identifies is this:
directors and officers do not owe a duty of care to third parties in the
context of negligent misrepresentation causing pure economic loss unless
they have guaranteed the accuracy of their words to the plaintiff or
otherwise assumed personal responsibility for what they say.
254
This
relates back to the notion of justified reliance discussed in Part I above.
On the facts at bar, Slatter J.A. found that the corporate officer did not
owe a personal duty of care to the investors who relied on the officer’s
words to their financial detriment. As he stated:
The investors knew they were dealing with a limited liability
partnership, and they must be taken to be aware of the legal
consequences of that. They willingly accepted and relied on
representations from that corporate entity. The only reasonable
expectations they could have had was that they were dealing with
a corporation. Any expectations about or reliance on the personal
involvement of the promoters was unreasonable . . . . They did
not even know for sure which director or promoter had prepared
which parts of the various documents, and therefore could have
had no reasonable reliance based on individual authorship. While
there may clearly be some cases where there is sufficient
proximity between the directors and the investors, on the facts in
this appeal proximity is not shown . . . .
255
253. Id.
254. Id. at para. 116. For discussion, see O’Byrne, Fraser & Philip, supra note 6, at 896-
897. For subsequent appellate discussion of Hogarth on this point, see the Alberta Court of
Appeal in Abt Estate v. Cold Lake Indus. Park GP Ltd., 2019 ABCA 16, para. 48 (Can.)
(emphasizing Hogarth as concerning whether there was reason to believe that the individual
defendant was “taking personal responsibility for the representations”).
255. Hogarth, 2013 ABCA at para. 121. See also id. at para 122 (“The issue is whether
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the details of Canadian
tort law in establishing a duty of care. Suffice it to say that it is a two-stage
process which assesses the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant.
The court first considers whether there is a prima facie duty of care in
place. In this regard, the court looks to proximity (that is, whether the
parties are in a close and direct relationship). Of particular note in the
context of pure economic loss arising from negligent misrepresentation
relates to the defendant’s undertaking and the plaintiff’s reliance.
According to the Supreme Court of Canada in a 2017 decision, “[w]here
the defendant undertakes to provide a representation or service in
circumstances that invite the plaintiff’s reasonable reliance, the defendant
becomes obligated to take reasonable care. And, the plaintiff has a right to
rely on the defendant’s undertaking to do so.”
256
Additionally, at this stage,
the court assesses whether the defendant should have reasonably foreseen
that the plaintiff would rely and whether the reliance, given the
circumstances, was reasonable.
257
If these kinds of ingredients are in place,
a duty of care is owed on a prima facie basis.
Justice Slatter’s concurring decision in Hogarth precedes the Supreme
Court of Canada’s latest articulation of the law of negligence—including
negligent misstatement—described above but is entirely consistent with it.
In his assessment of the prima facie duty question, Justice Slatter referred
to a number of factors derived from the case law as influencing his
deliberations, including whether the plaintiff chose to deal with the
corporation (which presumably tilts away from the director owing a duty of
care) or had the corporate relationship imposed (tilting towards a duty),
whether the tort was independent (tilting towards a duty) or “closely related
to corporate activity” (tilting away) as well as whether the loss was
economic (tilting away) or physical (tilting towards).
258
Justice Slatter’s
goal was to address, through these factors, the general “concern about the
effect that individual liability can have on . . . corporate structures and their
it was reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on the individual director’s personal involvement
so as to create a personal duty of care in the director. In this appeal it was reasonable for the
respondents to rely on the representations in the promotional documents, but the more
focused issue is whether it was reasonable for them to assume that the individual appellant
was infused with a personal responsibility for their accuracy.”).
256. Deloitte & Touche v. Livent Inc., [2017] 2 S.C.R. 855, para. 30 (Can.). Note in this
case that the SCC does not employ the term “special relationship” but instead, relies on duty
of care language.
257. Id. at para. 35.
258. Hogarth, 2013 ABCA at para. 110.
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efficacy.”
259
He also identified as relevant whether the negligent act was
committed “while engaged in the business of the corporation” and that the
individual “was not pursuing any personal interest beyond the corporate
interest”
260
—both of which presumably tilt away from a finding of personal
liability.
The duty analysis also has a second stage. As the Supreme Court
confirms, this stage asks “whether there are ‘residual policy considerations’
outside the relationship of the parties that may negate the imposition of a
duty of care?”
261
The idea is to give the court a chance to back away from
finding a duty of care if it would have larger, adverse effects. At this point
in his analysis, Justice Slatter emphasized that compensation of plaintiffs is
important but concurrently, it is a “legitimate desire of entrepreneurs to
operate in a limited liability environment.”
262
On a related front, Justice
Slatter observed that while “holding tortfeasors accountable”
263
and
“compensating victims”
264
are important, such concepts also have limits.
According to Justice Slatter, these concepts “do not automatically prevail
over all other objectives, such as the legitimate desire of entrepreneurs to
operate in a limited liability environment. They also do not displace any
responsibility on the plaintiff to accept some risk of what is known to be a
risky investment.”
265
He also emphasized the importance of the corporate
vehicle to the Canadian economy and that the corporation—including
concomitant limited liability—is “not a loophole, a technicality, or a
mischievous stratagem; it is an essential tool of social and economic
policy.”
266
Justice Slatter’s concurring decision was unanimously endorsed by a
subsequent panel of the Court of Appeal in Hall v. Stewart
267
as well as in
Abt Estate v. Cold Lake Industrial Park GP Ltd.,
268
thereby elevating its
status. Unlike the court in ADGA which easily finds liability, Justice
Slatter expressly considered corporate law values in order to temper the
influence of tort law. And unlike the court in ScotiaMcLeod which renders
liability rare and unusual, Justice Slatter brought tort law values to the table
259. Id.
260. Id. at para. 109.
261. Deloitte & Touche v. Livent Inc., [2017] 2 S.C.R. 855, para. 37 (Can.).
262. Hogarth, 2013 ABCA at para. 127.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at para. 68.
267. Hall v. Stewart, 2019 ABCA 98, para. 18 (Can.).
268. Abt Estate v. Cold Lake Industrial Park GP Ltd., 2019 ABCA 16, para. 44 (Can.).
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such that director and officer liability in negligence for pure economic loss
becomes possible but subject, first, to robust duty of care policy analysis.
In this way, Justice Slatter found a compromise between two extreme
camps. Put another way, he threaded the needle between corporate law and
tort.
d. The Fourth Line of Authority: Recasting and Broadening
Scotia McLeod
The Alberta Court of Appeal’s 2019 decision in Abt Estate posits the
view that in circumstances where the individual defendant takes
responsibility for the accuracy of his representations or otherwise invites
reliance, that may be “sufficient to identify a separate identity or interest
from that of the corporation so as to make the act or conduct complained of
his own.”
269
In this way, simple negligence causing pure economic loss
might be encompassed by ScotiaMcLeod after all but this requires a
reinterpretation of ScotiaMcLeod. That is, no longer does ScotiaMcLeod
merely attach personal liability in relation to the egregious misconduct
illustrated by its express hallmarks of liability, such as fraud and
dishonesty. Instead, the necessary separateness can now be accomplished
when the director or officer has invited the plaintiff to rely on her words,
thereby establishing an essential component to a finding that a duty of care
or special relationship exists between the parties. While establishing
liability on this basis can be helpful and fair, it requires reading
ScotiaMcLeod in a new way—at least from the perspective of Alberta
courts—and thereby marks a fourth evolution in the case law whereby
ScotiaMcLeod is recast and broadened. That is, the Alberta Court of
Appeal in Abt Estate followed ScotiaMcLeod but it is not consistent with
how the Alberta Court of Appeal in Blacklaws did. As discussed earlier,
the Court of Appeal in Blacklaws regarded ScotiaMcLeod as positing a test
for when a director or officer can secure an immunity for the tort she
committed.
As analysis in this Part illustrates, Canadian law in relation to director
or officer liability in negligence for pure economic loss is both inconsistent
and in flux. For example—and as Justice Marriott in Rudichuk v. Genesis
Land Development Corp. observed—despite “the seemingly different
approaches in ADGA and ScotiaMcLeod, the SCC has cited both cases with
269. Id. at para. 48.
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approval. . . .”
270
Beyond this, Canada’s most influential appellate court
has declared itself as unable to usefully contribute to this area of law
anymore. See Pryce v. Vuckovich wherein the Ontario Court of Appeal
tersely rejected the appellant’s request that it reconsider the ADGA and
ScotiaMcLeod dichotomy, stating: “We decline to do so and report what we
have said in ADGA that the policy considerations involved in these
decisions, if they are to be considered it should be done by the Supreme
Court of Canada.”
271
It is hoped that the Supreme Court of Canada will
soon grant leave to a case on point so that the matter can be thoroughly
resolved. Directors and officers are entitled to know the liability they
face—in advance—and why.
272
Such clarity will also, presumably, drive
down the cost of litigation. However, to date, the Supreme Court of
Canada has denied leave to appeal to numerous appellate cases on point,
including Hogarth.
273
As previously discussed, Justice Slatter’s approach in Hogarth
appears to point the way forward—as endorsed by the Hall and Abt Estate
cases. The notion Slatter J.A. posits in Hogarth is that directors and
officers can be liable for ordinary negligence causing pure economic loss
but only once the court has undertaken a contextualized and policy-laden
analysis of whether a duty of care exists in the first place. Tort law and
corporate law principles must be assessed.
CONCLUSION
This Article has identified important deficiencies in U.S. law
governing director and officer liability in tort to third parties. Most
concerning is that in Delaware, a plaintiff suing directors or officers in
negligence causing personal injury or property loss must prove active
negligence—that is malfeasance. Put another way, directors and officers
are not liable for nonfeasance causing personal injury or property loss
whereas other types of defendants are. This exempted status is problematic
on its own but particularly so in the context of personal injury. On what
policy basis are corporate law values permitted to overwhelm the plaintiff’s
right that others take reasonable care not to cause her personal injury?
Public policy going to the protection of bodily integrity is overwhelming in
such circumstances, a matter which California implicitly recognizes by
270. Rudichuk v. Genesis Land Development Corp., 2019 ABQB 132, para. 18 (Can.).
271. Pryce v. Vuckovich 2000 CanLII 27024 (ON CA).
272. O’Byrne, Fraser, & Philip, supra note 6, at 897.
273. Lance Hogarth, et al. v. Roger Simonson, 2013 CanLII 40340, 2 (S.C.C).
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including nonfeasance in its version of the personal participation doctrine.
The same argument holds in relation to director liability for property loss
because tort law values should trump corporate law values for this kind of
harm. As previously explored, director liability for personal injury and
property loss is axiomatic in Canada—across jurisdictions—such that
directors and officers are held accountable. Corporate personhood is not
considered a relevant factor in these cases.
Another significant concern relates to simple negligence causing pure
economic loss. As discussed, although the economic loss doctrine in the
U.S. generally precludes recovery in negligence, tort law allows recovery
for pecuniary damages for negligent misrepresentation where there is
justifiable reliance on the party providing the misleading information.
However, in the context of director and officer liability, courts do not seem
to even consider whether the plaintiff was justified in relying on the
defendant. Cases, including from California, functionally add a further
requirement before the plaintiff can succeed, namely that the loss involves
personal injury or property damage. The upshot in these jurisdictions is
that directors and officers are not liable for negligence causing pure
economic loss. This approach—where the duty analysis is pro forma and
exonerating—reduces the accountability of directors and officers who
personally cause financial harm to others by, for example, inviting
justifiable reliance. Corporate law notions are intact following this path,
but tort law principles are seriously compromised for reasons unmoored to
sound policy analysis. This approach to liability should be rejected.
The New York Court of Appeals in Kimmell, by way of contrast, leads
by offering a more carefully calibrated approach. This is because it
examined the relationship between the officer and the third party to
determine whether there was a specialized relationship which may give rise
to a duty. This included a concern whether reliance was justifiable. For
the court in Kimmell, it appears that directors and officers have no special
protections in relation to negligence causing pure economic loss. Instead,
tort law provides that protection (or not) according to its ordinary
principles. The New York approach resonates, at least to some degree,
with the tack followed by Slatter J.A. in the Hogarth case from Canada.
Justice Slatter showed he was willing to find a duty of care owed to third
parties when, for example, the director or officer assumed personal
responsibility for their words. The goal is for courts is to analyze the facts
closely so as to find the balance between protecting the defendant and
holding the defendant responsible; between under-compensating and over-
compensating the plaintiff; between corporate law values and tort law
values.
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Drawing on all the Article’s jurisdictional sources, we conclude that
the ideal liability regime is one that eschews special defenses for directors
and officers. This is because the ordinary rules of tort law provide
sufficient cover to directors and officers while special defenses are a
contagion. By winking at unreasonable conduct, special defenses erode
accountability, compromise corporate culture, and deny justice to the
otherwise worthy plaintiff.
